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ABSTRACT 
 In support of the National Defense Strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
has recognized energy security as an essential part of its strategic intent. In keeping with 
the DOD’s strategic goals, the Department of the Navy announced three pillars of success 
to meet those goals: Resilience, Reliability, and Efficiency. To best establish energy 
security for DOD installations, microgrids have been embedded into the energy systems 
as additional energy sources and controls that support mission readiness. Previous 
microgrid resilience research has focused on system design and cost efficiency. 
Considering a different approach, this thesis will pose the question of whether established 
recovery procedures build resilience within DOD microgrids. Using the Human 
Performance Impact Recovery Analysis (HPIRA) tool developed as a part of this 
research, human cognition and human error are implemented into various recovery 
procedures to determine the most successful recovery times and the man-hours required 
for a successful recovery. This research demonstrates the impact of human cognition in 
human actions and allows microgrid stakeholders to understand how human factors 
impact a microgrid system’s recovery. 
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Following guidance in the National Defense Strategy, the Department of Defense (DoD) has
set forth initiatives to improve energy security in their energy infrastructures and systems [1].
Specifically, the DoD desires to build resiliencewithin energy installations to ensuremission
readiness [2]. Resilience research for DoDmicrogrids is needed since they are susceptible to
their own energy disruptions while also improving resilience of DoD installations as well. To
support DoD energy initiatives, the United States (U.S.) Navy (USN) established resilience
as one of the three pillars of energy security with reliability and efficiency [3]. While most
resilience research of microgrids have been found to focus on system design and cost, this
thesis focuses on the human element involved in a microgrid recovery. Specifically, this
thesis analyzes if established recovery actions improve microgrid resilience, or potentially
further degrade it, when considering human factors.
This thesis provides a means of improving DoD microgrid resilience by determining man-
power requirements for realistic and effective recovery events. Additionally, this thesis
provides microgrid stakeholders a qualitative and quantitative source for microgrid recov-
ery man-hour requirements. This data should be used in DoD energy andmicrogrid decision
making efforts in regards manpower requirements and annual budgets for training, logistics,
and employment.
The methodology developed in this thesis is comprised of an eleven-step process to deter-
mine the total amount of man-hours needed to recover degraded microgrid components.
The eleven steps are as follows:
1. Define Microgrid Component of Interest
2. Determine Recovery Procedure for Microgrid Component of Interest
3. Perform Stakeholder Analysis
4. Create the Precedence Order of the Recovery Task List
5. Apply Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) and
Determine Human Error Probability (HEP) values for all Tasks
6. Choose the Appropriate Probability Distribution for Duration Sampling
7. Find Individual Task Duration based on chosen Probability Distribution
xix
8. Find All Possible Task Network Paths and Durations
9. Determine Critical Path and Duration of Task Network
10. Simulate and Analyze Component Recovery Durations
11. Conduct and Analyze a Back of the Envelope (BOE) Total Duration Calculation for
Multi-Component Failure Events
This methodology establishes the Human Performance Impact Recovery Analysis (HPIRA)
tool that evaluates the impact of the human element on microgrid recovery procedures. The
implementation of SPAR-H allows for human factors to be evaluated with eight Performance
Shaping Factors (PSFs) for each recovery task in the recovery process network. The final
SPAR-H provides HEP values to determine a sample duration time for each task. When
all paths are determined for a given recovery task network, each respective task’s sample
duration is totaled to determine total recovery time of each path. A Monte Carlo simulation
is applied to all recovery network paths to determine the critical recovery path and recovery
time.
This thesis applies the HPIRA tool to conduct two analyses. The first analysis applies
HPIRA to six different microgrid component recovery efforts to determine each recovery
processes’ critical path to successful completion. The critical paths are analyzed to determine
the man-hours needed for each successful recovery effort and assess if whether or not human
cognition plays a role in recovery efforts. In this analysis where conditions are simple and
ideal, it was determined that human cognition generally impacted recovery completion
efforts in a positive fashion. The second analysis evaluates two different multi-component
failure events to determine the total amount of man-hours needed for each recovery event.
By utilizing successful recovery times for degraded components from the first analysis,
total recovery times are able to be determined for the two multi-component failure events
with BOE calculations. Total man-hours required for these events are determined to see
how effective a single, two-person recovery team is able to recover a severely degraded
Naval Station (NAVSTA) microgrid. The total man-hours are compared to USN standards
for microgrid autonomy and consideration of efforts needed to meet those standards are
discussed. Given that a two-person team will not sufficiently restore a multi-component
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The Department of Defense (DoD) has aligned itself with the mission priorities set forth by
the National Defense Strategy to “support strategic priorities expressed in theatre posture
plans, operation plans, and core mission essential tasks” to include energy security [1].
To maintain and support mission readiness, DoD installations require their energy systems
to be resilient, which rely on the availability and reliability of involved systems [2]. The
Department of Navy (DoN) has developed an energy security framework to support DoD
guidance by specifying three pillars of energy security as seen in Figure 1.1: 1) Reliability,
2) Resiliency, and 3) Efficiency. In the past, the DoD has dedicated a great amount of
resources into researching and developing solutions to increase reliability and efficiency in
the context of energy security. Resilience, however, has significantly less completed research
work than that of reliability and efficiency. This is due to the complexity and consistency of
measuring resilience, determining the proper and appropriate definition of resilience, and
using a holistic perspective in the context of energy security [3]. With this in mind, the
DoN and DoD are pursuing innovative avenues of research to improve resilience of energy
systems within DoD installations [1].
Figure 1.1. The Three Pillars of Energy Security. Source: [1].
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1.1 Statement of Contribution
The primary purpose of this thesis is to improve resilience within DoD installation mi-
crogrids to support DoD directives in energy security. This thesis will apply a Human
Reliability Analysis (HRA) to established recovery procedures and determine man-hours
required for a successful recovery event. By understanding the human effort needed for suc-
cessful microgrid recovery events, stakeholders can best plan, improve, and support DoD
microgrid personnel limitations to improve microgrid resilience. The Human Performance
Impact Recovery Analysis (HPIRA) tool developed within this thesis allows for the impact
of human error to be assessed within recovery procedures. Results from the HPIRA tool will
be assessed to determine the most successful recovery times and the man-hours required
for various recovery scenarios.
1.2 Resilience within a System
In order to improve resilience of anymicrogrid system, an appropriate definition of resilience
must be chosen along with properly identifying its contribution factors. This allows for
focused analysis of potential system improvements and their impacts on improvingmicrogrid
system resilience. Woods explains that resilience is defined as an adaptation of a system’s
robustness, rebound, graceful extensibility, and sustained adaptability [4]. The four concepts
as explained in [4] are:
• Robustness: How effectively a system reacts or responds to an increased set of distur-
bances on the system
• Rebound: How effectively a system can bounce back and return to its normal level or
operation when impacted by disrupting event
• Extensibility: How effectively a system overcomes risk of sudden failure when it is
pushed beyond its boundaries
• Sustained Adaptability: How effectively a system adapts to future surprises as condi-
tions evolve
The concept of rebound aims to understand how certain systems return to normal operations
better than others [4]. Rebound capabilities are meant to improve a system’s response from
significantly disrupting events that degrade normal operational conditions [4]. This concept
encourages system modeling exploration of disrupted systems so that a system’s rebound,
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in both operation and design, can be improved and capable of taking on various disrupting
events [4]. This thesis focuses on improving the rebound of a DoD microgrid system by
assessing the cognitive effects of operators carrying out recovery procedures. Additionally,
this thesis will present its methodology and experimentation. The findings will contribute
to improving microgrid resilience within DoD installations.
1.3 Systems Engineering Application
Systems engineering is the practice of expressing needs or requirement into “operationally
suitable blocks of systems” [5]. Blanchard and Fabrycky [5] explain that the Systems
Engineering Process (SEP) is an iterative process that includes requirements analysis,
functional analysis and allocation, design synthesis and verification, and system analysis and
control. Additionally, the SEP considers a holistic approach to include concepts of design,
manufacturing, test and evaluation, and support resources to best balance cost, schedule, and
performance throughout the system’s life cycle [5]. By implementing systems engineering
within microgrid systems, operational effectiveness and suitability can be improved [3]. A
facet of operational effectiveness and suitability is reliability engineering. In [5], reliability
engineering focuses on a system’s probability to operate with or without failure.
Many research efforts such as system design modifications and life cycle cost estimations
have been assessed on their impacts to building resilience within microgrids, however, they
do not encompass the entirety of SEP but only touch on a few considerations. This is not to
say that those efforts are inadequate or incomplete, but that in fact they are an essential “piece
of the puzzle” in improving microgrid system resilience. It is upon all systems engineers to
take a piece of the “how to improve microgrid resilience” puzzle and iterate and synthesize
their findings with one another other to improve microgrid system resilience. Microgrid
recovery processes will be analyzed from the system engineering perspective to include
similar and different considerations of the holistic perspective as described in [3]. This
thesis will apply system engineering practices of stakeholder analysis, project management,
and reliability engineering to determine if microgrid recovery processes improve microgrid
resilience.
3
1.3.1 Microgrid System Stakeholders
The purpose of identifying system stakeholders is to ensure that all “voices” that are
involved within a DoD microgrid system are considered and communicated with so that
special interests, needs, and/or concerns are addressed and well known [5]. An important
part of systems engineering is to determine primary and secondary stakeholders who are
involved within a given task, operation, or system. By performing this analysis, end users,
operators, and maintainers can be identified in performing microgrid recovery processes.
1.3.2 Microgrid System Project Management
Systems engineering project management scheduling tools such as project task networks
allow for stakeholders to properly plan, organize, and coordinate project efforts. Project
task networks evaluate sequential project events or activities from a “beginning” node an
“end” node with corresponding duration times for each node [5]. The network tasks can be
completed in parallel or series while also represents the dependencies between tasks [5].
For microgrids, project task networks can be utilized for various functions such as the
system’s technical operating procedures, maintenance procedures, and recovery procedures.
Assessing all tasks involved within a set of procedures allows for determining “bottle neck”
points within a process in which delays or degrades the task network. Focusing on these
efforts allow for potential resilience improvements within microgrid systems. Utilizing the
Critical Path Method (CPM), the certain nodes and paths within a task network that dictate
the progress of task completion can be identified for improvements.
Critical Path Method
The CPM is a scheduling method applied to a project task network to determine the path
which represents the longest duration. In determining the critical path, the critical tasks and
inter-dependencies are identified. By combining those tasks’ duration times, the shortest
possible time to complete the project can be determined. This time is noteworthy for a project
manager since it benchmarks times for project [5]. The critical path is also important for
project managers to track in the case of issues or delays of tasks that may impact the critical
path.
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1.3.3 Microgrid Reliability Engineering
Reliability engineering is a facet of system design development that includes program
planning, analyses and predictions, and test and evaluation [5]. Reliability engineering
focuses on the Probability of Failure (P(f)) and/or Probability of Success (P(s)) tasks that
determine the the P(f) and/or P(s) of a system [5]. By researching and designing systems
for reliability, one can potentially reduce the P(f) and risk of a system. In result, maximum
operational reliability of the system can be obtained [5].
1.4 Purpose of Microgrids
Microgrids have become a “flexible solution” for energy security concerns of modern
electrical grids [6]. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Microgrid Exchange Group
defines microgrids as “a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources
within clearly defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity with
respect to the grid” [7]. Microgrids have provided necessary electrical power redundancy,
energy cost savings, improved clean energy integration with renewable energy resources,
and diverse options of electrical power supply to various rural and remote communities [6].
Hirsch, Parag, and Guerrero [6] explain how microgrids have provided improved resilience
for energy systems and security by having the ability to rebound, or bounce back quickly
from a problem. Resilience is a desired quality for microgrids to support DoD policy and
objectives such as 10U.S.C. § 2911(e) and 42U.S.C. § 15852 to improve energy security [8].
1.4.1 Microgrid Description
As a System of Systems (SoS), a microgrid is a critical system within DoD energy in-
frastructures that is composed of various sub-systems and resources that work together to
produce electrical power [5]. A simple microgrid architecture shown in Figure 1.2 provides
four primary functions: 1) Generate power, 2) Distribute power, 3) Store energy, and 4)
System control [8]. Figure 1.2 shows the communication and control, and the electrical
network within the microgrid architecture as well as its connections to the local utility grid,
various types distributed energy and resources, and various types of control units.
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Figure 1.2. Simple Microgrid Architecture. Source: [8]
Microgrid operations rely on Distributed Energy Resources (DER) that are comprised
of Distributed Generation (DG) resources and energy storage technologies [9]. Figure 1.3
describes the breakdown of DERs and the various types of DG resources and energy storage
technologies that are involved in each.
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Figure 1.3. DER Resources to Include DG Resources and Energy Storage
Technologies. Source: [9].
With the objective “to ensure better energy reliability, security, and efficiency” of installation
power, microgrids provide two primary modes of operation: grid-connected and island
mode [10]. Microgrids in grid-connected mode supports and works with the local utility
grid to exchange power [11]. As the normal condition ofmicrogrid operations, [11] describes
that grid-connected mode provides energy management with the following three assets at
their disposal:
1. DER controllers (DG and optional storage)
2. Load management
3. Control of the power exchange with the main grid.
Microgrids in island mode operate, control, and manage local generation of consumed
energy with the ability to disconnect from the local utility grid [11]. When operating in
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island mode, a microgrid must be capable of supporting its designed infrastructure of
DG units, loads, and storage devices collectively [11]. Island mode operation allows for
increased reliability of an installation’s electric power system by integrating “different on-
site sources with energy storage and load control” [11]. For critical installations that fall
under entities like the DoD or healthcare systems, island mode operation provides back up
system reliability so that continued power supply is maintained” [11].
Microgrids generate their own power by use of various types of DG resources. As shown in
Figure 1.3, DG resources consists of conventional and non-conventional generation types.
Conventional generation types such as diesel powered generators are a common means
of back-up power that provides quick start up and power production. Conversely, diesel
generators are inefficient, produce greenhouse gas emissions, and are costly [6], [11]. Non-
conventional generation types such as photovoltaic Photovoltaic Cell (PV) generators and
wind turbine generators support renewable energy initiatives that result in zero emissions
and require no additional fuel costs [6]. While renewable energy sources provide many
benefits, they are each dependent to their unique environments [6].
A microgrid’s power distribution system is the means by which “energy [is transmitted]
between generation sources, the grid, energy storage systems, and loads” [3]. Three primary
distribution systems that microgrids utilize are direct current Direct Current (DC) lines,
alternating current lines Alternating Current (AC), and high frequency AC lines [12].
In all three distribution systems, common elements such as distribution cabling exist.
Underground power lines that are directly buried underground are one means of distributing
power with all three systems. Overhead power lines and buses carry generated power
between utility poles and a microgrid system as well [3]. Unlike underground cabling,
overhead cabling remains exposed and vulnerable to damage or deterioration. Additionally,
transformers and DC-AC converters are utilized within power distribution systems as a
power conversion elements and connectors [3], [8]. Lastly, distribution systems require
the use of switches to regulate the direction and load of power being transmitted between
systems [13].
Microgrids are a desirable means of energy production and usage for the DoD because to
their ability to store energy for emergency use, maintaining energy consistency, and allow
for islanded operations among many more reasons. Microgrids are essential in supporting
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certain facilities like those found in the military and medical installations [3]. The primary
purpose of an Energy Storage Systems (ESS) is to balance the generated power from DG
resources and its power demand [14]. Figure 1.3 shows the variation of energy storage
options that can be utilized within a microgrid infrastructure to include: Battery Energy
Storage, flywheels, Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage (SMES), Compressed Air
Energy storage (CAES), and Pumped Storage (PS) [9]. Microgrid systems use ESS for
system stability by alleviating incidents of overvoltages and undervoltages due to power
generation fluctuations from certain DG resources. These fluctuations occur because of
different load demands such as various time demands such as working hours and non-
working hours, as well as various environments such as cool nights and hot summer days [6],
[8].
A microgrid controller monitors and controls all component functions within a microgrid
architecture [10]. Microgrid controllers function with explicit commands and ensures power
quality and reliability [6], [10]. As the overarching control system, microgrid controllers
manage and command DG resources, stored power loads, and the power distribution system
[6], [8]. The microgrid controller is capable of regulating the power flow and connection
state between the entire system and any connection to an external utility power system [15].
Giachetti et. al. [3] explains how microgrids can be classified as one of three levels of
authority: primary controls, secondary controls, and tertiary controls. Primary controls
regulate available power with generators and storage systems by monitoring local voltage
and current readings. Secondary controls coordinate microgrid generation and storage
capabilities. Tertiary controls regulate the power that is distributed to and from the local
utility power system [3]. Microgrid controllers are designed in either a centralized or
decentralized control framework that can customize power delivery [16].
1.4.2 Microgrid System Description
This thesis leverages the system architecture and system model as used within Peterson’s
work [8]. The microgrid system architecture utilized in [8] represents a generic DoD
installation microgrid infrastructure with following major components included:
• DG in the form of diesel generators and a PV array
• Energy Storage in the form of a chemical battery
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• A connection to the utility grid through a substation
• A distribution system made up of a mix of overhead and underground lines
• Facilities of various uses and sizes
Figure 1.4 displays the one line diagram of Peterson’s microgrid architecture [8] that is also
used in this thesis.
Figure 1.4. One-Line Diagram for a DoD Microgrid System. Source: [8].
1.5 Purpose of Microgrid Recovery Actions
In an effort to build resilience within modern microgrid infrastructures, tested and proved
recovery procedures can provide a quick and efficient means of restoring degraded systems
back to normal operations. Similarly, the utilization of recovery actions can alleviate power
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congestion that is placed on microgrids that require certain power loads to support critical
equipment or facilities [6]. Van Bossuyt and O’Halloran point out that routine recovery
procedures can “prevent incipient failure from causing a system-wide failure” [17].
While there are many advantages in utilizing recovery procedures for microgrid restoration,
there are alsomany challenges can occur. The implementation of recovery procedures are just
as vital as the recovery actions being used. As discussed by Spranca, Minsk, and Baron [18],
cognitive thinking factors such as omission and commission play a significant role in an
operator ability to successfully recover a system or further degrade it. Another challenge
for implementing recovery procedures is potential of emergence within the microgrid. It is
important for facility managers to be cognisant of their microgrid infrastructures and the
recovery procedures to be used so that when implemented, little to no further disruptions
arise within the system or connected systems when being restored. Woods [4] also explains
that the recovery, or rebound, of a system involves the “process of adapting to disruptions”
over time since a system does not become stagnant when disrupted. With that in mind,
systemsmust learn from past lessons to adapt to new challenges or disruptions. Additionally,
it is important to remember that while the primary goal is to preserve the microgrid system
when disturbed, the process of adapting to other disturbances continues to transform for
both the system and the environment over time [4]. Woods provides this thought not just
for rebound of a system, or even recovery procedures specifically, but also to emphasize
that resilience thinking is continuous and must consider “systems, linkages, thresholds, and
cycles...and [what drives them]” over time [14].
1.6 Threats to DoD Energy Security
For DoD installations, various types of energy threats and attacks have potential to degrade
military readiness and effectiveness. In order to combat this, the DoD must anticipate
possible threats to energy security and plan for rapid response and recovery in order to
maintain mission readiness. The DoD has set its chief priority “to ensure mission readiness
of the armed forces by pursing energy security and resilience” [2]. Energy security threats
for the DoD can be in form of hostile attacks, natural disasters, and technical energy system
failures. For the United States (U.S.) Marine Corps (USMC), the maximum autonomy time
for installation energy systems is 14 days so minimal impact is taken on critical mission
areas [19]. For U.S. Navy (USN), the maximum autonomy time is seven days [20].
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Microgrids on DoD installations have become targets for various types of hostile attacks.
Intentional physical attacks, such as terrorist attacks, can pose a significant threat to DoD
energy security by degrading critical power infrastructures such as telecommunication
sites that are essential for mission readiness [21]. Additionally, cyber-attacks can pose a
significant threat to DoD energy systems by degrading a system’s network and control
capabilities [21]. External and internal cyber-threats, such as denial of service attacks, can
disrupt normal operational services within DoD networks [21]. The DOE has found that
major attacks or incidents of these kind can create significant DoD issues such as loss of
personal identification information, critical performance data, or lack of support services to
name a few [21].
Natural disasters and severe weather, such as hurricanes, are another type of energy security
threat that can cause similar damage to the physical infrastructure of DoD installation
microgrids and local utility grids. High winds and strong weather that result from hurricanes
or blizzards can damage essential energy support infrastructure such as power lines and
distribution centers. As the primary cause of grid disruptions, severe weather can cause
regional grids to be either degraded or limited in their operations, resulting in short to
long term power outages [21]. Power outages due to severe weather can pose significant
operational threats to DoD installations. Restoration planning for both the installation’s
microgrid infrastructure and its local utility connections must be considered together since
the both systems work together.
Energy infrastructures for DoD installations are also susceptible to degradation of their
own energy backup sources, such as microgrids for local utility power. Most if not all
energy systems on DoD installations receive primary power from local utility grids and
rely on them to maintain normal energy operations. Local utility grids are dependent on
the availability and reliability of their own infrastructures and sub-systems within them.
Similarly, the DOE acknowledges that DoD energy systems, such as microgrids, are subject
to the same security and resilience vulnerabilities in terms of reliability and availability of
their systems and sub-systems [21]. The DoDmust ensure that their microgrid infrastructure
designs are capable of supporting the electrical loads required of them. Microgrids need to
be well designed in all aspects of system suitability, to include reliability and availability,
to name a few. Regardless of local utility power availability, if sufficient design parameters
aren’t built within a microgrid system or its components, the microgrid itself can lose its
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operability to create, distribute, or store power [22].
1.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter has discussed the background and need for improving energy resilience of DoD
installation microgrids. Specifically, this chapter presents the thesis question as to whether
human factors impact the rebound, or recovery time, of degraded microgrids. The follow-
on chapters analyze the effect of a HRA on microgrid recovery procedures and system
recovery time. Chapter 2 includes a literature review of microgrid resilience work, recovery
procedures, and human factors. Chapter 3 introduces the HPIRA tool developed with an 11
step methodology process. Chapter 4 applies the HPIRA tool to various microgrid recovery
processes to analyze the effect of human factors on recovery time. Chapter 5 concludes this
thesis with a summary of findings, recommendations, and propositions for future and follow
on work.
13




This chapter presents a literature review of previously conducted research work on mi-
crogrid resilience and its role within energy security. Within this chapter, each subsection
will analyze different research topics, including resilience theory, recovery modeling, and
human reliability models for including humand factors in recovery processes. This literature
review identifies and presents gaps within current research and revels additional research
questions on each topic. Each topic is evaluated for context, purpose, and added value of po-
tential research work to improving microgrid resilience research. Synthesized together, the
literature review provides a clear understanding and identification of research gaps within
previously published works.
2.1 Definition of Resilience
Resilience has various definitions within literature. Depending on the purpose of the def-
inition, one definition of resilience may differ considerably from another. For instance,
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers American Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers (ASME) considers resilience from an engineering perspective. The ASME defines
resilience as “the rapid return to full function after those events that occur” [23]. Resilience in
a psychology perspective is defined as “good, stable, and consistent adaption [of individual
behaviors] under challenging conditions” [24]. Due to the differences of resilience defini-
tions, it is important to choose the best fitted definition for a specific research application
so that the research is properly conducted to achieve a useful outcome.
U.S. Government agencies and organizations define resilience differently from their civil-
ian and commercial counterparts, primarily because of the nature of government work
and services. For instance, DoD installations fall under the resilience definitions found in
the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 4170.11, 10 U.S. Code § 101(e)(6) and
10 U.S. Code § 101(e)(8). DoDI defines energy resilience as “the ability to prepare for
and recover from energy disruptions that impact mission assurance on military installa-
tions” [25]. Specific to military installations, 10 U.S. Code § 101(e)(8) defines military
installation resilience as “the ability to avoid, prepare for, minimize the effect of, adapt
15
to, and recover from anticipated and unanticipated changes” [26]. While these instructions
provide strategic guidance to energy security on DoD installations, they lack the detailed
focus on energy resilience. Establishing energy resilience will ensure that DoD installations
are capable of preparing and recovering from local utility power interruptions to support
mission assurance and installation energy security [8]. While the DoD provides overarching
guidance and requirements, individual military services and federal departments establish
specific instructions for their respective services or departments to follow [8]. Following
DoD guidance, the USN seeks to improve energy security bymeans of improving resilience,
reliability and efficiency with a required maximum autonomy metric of seven days [20],
[27].
Over time, various definitions of resilience have developed across various domains. While
there are many domains for resilience, four particular domains are considered in a research
perspective: Organizational, Social, Economic, and Engineering [28]. Determining the
definition of resilience in an engineering domain best suits the goal for this thesis. Unlike
other domains, the engineering domain involves technical systems, human interaction, and
technology [28]. Engineering resilience has been defined as a system’s “ability to anticipate
and adapt from a surprise or failure” [29]. Similarly, engineering resilience is also described
as knowing the normal functionality of a technical system so that if it fails, one will
understand how it fails [28], [30].
While various definitions of resilience exists, Woods’ [4] categorization of four resilience
concepts best defines this work’s research on microgrid resilience. Rather than defining
resilience in terms of variables or as one general concept, Woods defines resilience as four
concepts that each contribute to the entirety of resilience: Robustness, Rebound, Extensi-
bility, and Sustained Adaptability [4]. By assessing resilience within these four concepts,
progress and projection can be assessed within each category in order to build resilience
within systems and networks [4]. For this work, focus on the concept of rebound guides
the research to query “what is needed in advance of a challenge event...and how systems
continue to change as they adapt, as well as how systems provoke changes through adap-
tation” [4]. Unlike previous definitions of resilience that focuses on reactive actions to a
degraded system, Woods’ definition forces the thought of what is required of a system prior
to a disruptive event, and from there, how can one best prepare for that event to minimize
the disruption. For the purpose of this research, predetermined recovery procedures will be
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assessed prior to a microgrid system recovery in order to evaluate the effectiveness in its
contribution towards the system’s “rebound.”
2.2 System Recovery Procedures
Resilience, along with reliability and efficiency, are the DoN’s primary objectives for energy
security in order to ensure mission readiness [1]. With constant technological innovation
for military weapons and base supplies and services, the DoD is becoming more reliant on
installation energy support. For those reasons, it is imperative that DoD installations adapt
to become as resilient, reliable, and efficient in their energy production and sustainment.
While there has been research conducted on improving resilience within microgrid systems
from different approaches, none specifically have focused on operator recovery procedures.
For instance, Peterson’s work assess the Expected Life Cycle Mission Impact (ELMI)
metric in design considerations to improve of DoD microgrid resilience [8]. Hildebrand’s
work assesses cost estimation of DoD microgrid resilience based off of microgrid design
and sustainment utilization [31]. Most resilience research has analyzed microgrid system
designs and specifications as well as impacts from other factors such as life cycle costs,
system redundancy, and maintenance management. Like most design efforts, improvements
and modifications to microgrid systems are developed as a result of failures to improve
system operability.
For most military operational systems, pre-planned responses or casualty control actions
have been established in an attempt to minimize degradation and damage of a system. Ad-
ditionally, those responses and actions reduce the time that the system is out of commission
to improve the rebound of that system. FollowingWoods [4] and Hollnagel’s [30] definition
of resilience, proactive actions should be considered prior to disruptive events in order to
improve the rebound of a system. By implementing this concept, research can focus more on
increasing the number of things that can go right rather than trying to reduce the number of
things that go wrong [30]. The concept of being proactive rather than reactive in improving
system resilience allows for the stakeholders of the system to anticipate possible failures
and develop and actions to prevent them. This thesis will simulate various sets of recovery
procedures for degraded microgrids to identify factors that improve rebound or the factors
that inhibit it.
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The concept of being proactive rather than reactive in building resilience prepares system
operators, maintainers, and managers to mitigate potential degradation issues of microgrid
systems. Inmany cases, established recovery procedures have been created and implemented
on DoD installations to improve the rebound of a microgrid system by focusing on reducing
recovery time. For instance, at the United StatesMarine Corps (USMC)Air Ground Combat
Center United States Marine Corps (USMC) Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC)
Twentynine Palms, attempts have been made to improve microgrid system recovery times
by use of recovery procedures [32]. Similarly, the USN utilizes established Engineering
Operational Casualty Control procedures for specific equipment in recovery efforts on
naval vessels and shore installations. The private sector follows similar efforts to decrease
recovery times based on recovery operations from experienced linemen and cablemen.
References such as The Lineman’s and Cableman’s Field Manual [33] provide general
operating and recovery guidance formicrogrid system components. Even for Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFAC), various sets of recovery procedures are required to
properly reestablish normal conditions for a degraded system [32]. Since degradation can
be a result of multiple factors, various sets of recovery procedures need to be assessed to
best restore degraded microgrids. Factors such as varying weather conditions, critical load
requirements, and modifications of recovery procedures need to be considered.
Many assume that implementing standardized recovery procedures will guarantee improved
rebound and resilience of microgrid systems. That assumption, however, is not necessarily
always true. In this thesis, the argument is raised that no, recovery actions do not ensure
improved resilience of microgrid system and can potentially further degrade the system.
The primary factor in testing this hypothesis will be assessing human reliability, in the form
of human error, within the recovery procedures used for recovering a degraded microgrid.
With a HRA applied to recovery procedures, a reliability analysis will be conducted to see
at what recovery time durations do recovery procedures become more beneficial or more
harmful to a recovery process.
2.3 Human Reliability Analysis
When implementing any kind of pre-planned responses such as recovery procedures to
restore microgrid systems, the effectiveness of those responses depend the human reliability
of the actions or tasks being taken to restore a systems. The underlying assumption is that
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recovery actions improve a system’s ability to recover. However, when considering the
human factor, that assumption is not always the case because human beings are not perfect
and make mistakes. What needs to be considered in a recovery process is if the mistakes
or actions being completed are by omission or commission. When evaluating a scenario
to determine if recovery procedures improve certain metrics like recovery time and speed,
understanding human reliability can potentially improve those recovery metrics or further
degrade them.
Human cognition is how a person gains and uses knowledge to participate in reasoning
and remembering [34]. Since human cognition is primarily a psychological topic, is not
always considered within engineering research. To evaluate the effectiveness of recovery
procedures, an operator’s human cognition must be considered in addition to the recovery
tasks themselves because they both contribute to the overall success of the recovery task.
From the perspective of a microgrid operator tasked with repairing a part of the system,
omission and commission must be considered as contributors to human error since both can
potentially limit or worsen the restoration of a system. Acts of omission “may result from
ignorance” and acts of commission may “involve more malicious motives and intentions,”
therefore, each recovery task carries a risk of complications that can result from human
error [18]. What is unknown is how much human error can be anticipated in affecting a
task so much that it fails, which could result in limitations or further delay in recovering a
system. For complex recovery procedures, human operators will always have some degree
of omission and commission in their thought process or actions that can very well influence
their performance on a task. Those influenced tasks can result in a faster or slower system
recovery, or it could also cause additional failures within the system.
In every decision and action a person takes, human error can occur. One way to measure
human error is to conduct a HRA. Human reliability is a challenge to asses because human
factors are not predictable and are difficult to improve [35]. Events such as the 2011
Southwest Blackout is an example of one of the United States’ largest power failures. The
outage was a result of human error that created multiple cascading failures [36]. Various
analysis methods were used to to find the root cause failure but ultimately it became prudent
for investigators to conduct HRAs. For a HRA, many forms of analysis methods exist.
The Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) method was initially utilized
for the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission [37]. While the THERP method provides an
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effective means of determining human reliability, it is known to require in depth training
and experience for it to be correctly implemented. A similar method, the Accident Sequence
Evaluation Program Human Reliability Analysis Procedure (ASEP) [37], provides results
that are similar in quality and effectiveness as THERP, but in a simpler and more efficient to
complete [37]. The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-HumanReliability Analysis (SPAR-H)
method [37] was derived from both THERP and ASEP methods to create a simple and
generalized method for determine HEP [38]. While all methods are effective in determining
human reliability and error, each of the methods’ applications and purposes serve different
needs and consider different constraints. As shown in [35], SPAR-H is an appropriate
and effective method for a power grid environment HRA because of its simplicity and
consideration of multiple performance factors. For the same reasons and desired goals, the
SPAR-H method will be utilized for this thesis’ HRA analysis.
2.3.1 SPAR-H
As a simple and proven method, SPAR-H has become a common HRA approach in de-
termining human reliability for various systems in different scenarios. For the SPAR-H
method, each task, or Human Failure Event (HFE), is categorized as a Diagnosis and/or
Action event. Each diagnosis/action HFE is then rated by the following eight performance
shaping factors Performance Shaping Factor (PSF):
1. Available Time: Level of Amount of time relative to the time that is available for the
HFE being assessed
2. Stress/Stressors: Level of undesirable conditions in completing the HFE being as-
sessed
3. Complexity: Level of evaluating performance challenges an HFE being assessed, to
include both the HFE and its operating environment
4. Experience/Training: Level of operator experience and/or training of the HFE being
assessed
5. Procedures: Level of available operating procedures for the HFE being assessed
6. Ergonomics/Human-Machine Interference: Level of adequacy of human-machine
interfaces of the HFE being assessed
7. Fitness for Duty: Level of the HFE operator’s physical and mental conditions in
conducting the HFE being assessed.
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8. Work Processes: Level of management support and policies that are used for the HFE
being assessed [39].
Each PSF is assessed individually and separately on how they impact an individual HFE.
What is unique to SPAR-H over other HRA methods is that the eight PSFs can result in
either positive or negative effects on performance [39]. Evaluating each PSF in this way
ultimately determines the final Human Error Probability (HEP) that represents the given
HFE. In Figure 2.1, HEP is represented as an output function of a single PSF input variable.
The relationship shows that better performance of a PSF results in a lower HEP value, or
lower P(f), of an HFE. In the opposite case, having more error involved with the PSF being
assessed results in a larger HEP, or greater P(f), value.
Figure 2.1. HEP as a Function of a PSF Variable. Source: [39].
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In [37], SPAR-H worksheets are included to guide the PSF ratings for At-Power conditions.
The worksheets walk a user through the PSF ratings to calculate each HFE’s HEP, or P(f).
For the purpose of this thesis, At-Power conditions will be used because they provide a
more conservative approach that is designed for conditions in which emergency operating
procedures are utilized [37].
2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided a review of literature that relates to the thesis question and the
implemented research. Focus was placed on previously conducted microgrid resilience
work, recovery procedures, and human factors. Chapter 3 introduces the HPIRA tool used




This chapter presents the research methodology to assess the effect of human factors on
microgrid recovery procedures and system resilience. The methodology developed herein
involves 11 steps that lead to the development of the HPIRA tool. The logic and need for
each step is detailed and explained below. This methodology will be applied in Chapter 4
to measure the effect human error has on the recovery time of microgrid infrastructure and
a representative Naval Station (NAVSTA) microgrid system.
3.1 Methodology Description
This section describes the research methodology used in this thesis. The methods presented
herewere developed through an iterative process that evaluated the effectiveness and purpose
of each step to answer the thesis question. The methodology includes existing tools and
data inputs from [8] to include resource data, microgrid system architecture, and microgrid
system simulation programming. The 11 step HPIRA process are as follows:
1. Define Microgrid Component of Interest
2. Determine Recovery Procedure for Microgrid Component of Interest
3. Perform Stakeholder Analysis
4. Create the Precedence Order of the Recovery Task List
5. Apply SPAR-H and Determine HEP values for all Tasks
6. Choose the Appropriate Probability Distribution for Duration Sampling
7. Find Individual Task Duration based on chosen Probability Distribution
8. Find All Possible Task Network Paths and Duration
9. Determine Critical Path and Duration of Task Network
10. Simulate and Analyze Component Recovery Duration
11. Conduct and Analyze a Back of the Envelope (BOE) Total Duration Calculation for
a Multi-Component Failure Events
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3.1.1 Step 1: Define Microgrid Component of Interest
In this step, the microgrid component failure scenario needs to be chosen and defined. Each
scenario needs to include the following:
1. Description of scenario background
2. Definition of the microgrid architecture
3. Statement of assumptions
Describe the scenario background to include environmental conditions that can affect mi-
crogrid operations. For instance, note extreme weather conditions and/or extreme load
demands. Define the microgrid architecture so that all possible components can be assessed
as a cause of failure to be analyzed. Additionally, determine the microgrid system’s operat-
ing mode so it can be established as the recovery benchmark. State all assumptions within
the scenario environment, microgrid system operation, and microgrid system design. In-
clude the complexity of the microgrid system as well as the available support services. By
clarifying these scenario details, simulation results can be analyzed for true and meaningful
conclusions for stakeholder interests. Finally, for DoD installation microgrids, ensure that
all details remain within Distribution A classification.
Example: Microgrid Component of Interest
Assume a single microgrid component degrades a microgrid in island mode. Choose a
microgrid component to be assessed as the degraded component of interest.
3.1.2 Step 2: Determine the Recovery Task List for the Microgrid
Component of Interest
When Step #1 is complete, determine the system recovery procedure tasks list based on the
root cause of failure within the microgrid infrastructure. Utilizing procedure guidance such
as “The Lineman’s and Cableman’s Field Manual” [33] and/or referring to subject matter
experts such as facility utility managers and facility engineers, create a task list in order of
sequential completion. Additionally, note the minimum, median, and maximum duration
time estimations for each task completion. Next, note which tasks are predecessors of other
tasks.
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Example: Recovery Task List
The recovery procedure set, or task list, that will be evaluated is found in Table 3.1. All
tasks will be named sequentially from Task “A” to Task “F.”
Table 3.1. Example Recovery Procedure Task List and Durations (hr)
Recovery Task Min Max Mean Follow On Task
Task A 0.50 1.00 1.50 B,D,E
Task B 2.50 3.00 3.50 C
Task C 0.50 1.00 1.50 F
Task D 3.00 5.00 7.00 F
Task E 3.50 4.00 4.50 F
3.1.3 Step 3: Perform a Stakeholder Analysis
To determine the recovery team members, or those who will be participating in the task list
recovery procedures, create a stakeholder analysismatrix. List all individuals or services that
participate in operating, supervising, and supporting DoD microgrid systems. Additionally,
include the stakeholders’ specific interests and estimated impact level.
Example: Stakeholder Analysis
Consider a recovery teammanager that needs to restore themicrogrid systemwith three team
members. The members will complete the five tasks presented in Table 3.1 to successfully
restore the system. The assumptions for the scenario are: 1) Team members are fully trained
and capable of completing tasks, 2) Team members are fully supported and equipped to
complete tasks, and 3) Environmental conditions are ideal for efficient task completion.
A stakeholder analysis of the given scenario is shown in Table 3.2. Refer to this stakeholder
analysis to identify recovery team members and additional stakeholders.
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Table 3.2. Example System Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholders Interest Est. Impact
Manager Supervisor of operating team High
Senior Team Member Lead team member in operation High
Team Member Team member in operation High
Supply Team Provides resource support Medium
3.1.4 Step 4: Create the Precedence Order of the Recovery Task List
Referring to the recovery task list as generated in Step #2 and with consideration of the
recovery team, walk through the generated task list and determine which tasks show depen-
dency of completion on others. Document this dependency as a precedence list showing
how the completion of one node initiates another. Specify this precedence with “From” and
“To” nodes until the last node. The starting node will be the initial task and the final node
will be the recovered task.
Example: Precedence List
Follow each recoverymember and task completion dependency to determine the precedence
order of each node task. Table 3.3 summarizes the precedence order.
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Table 3.3. Example System Precedence List








3.1.5 Step 5: Apply SPAR-H and Determine HEP Values for all Tasks
The next step is to evaluate the effect of human cognition on the successful completion of
each recovery task, or HFE. Human cognition can be attributed to two thought processes:
Omission and Commission. For the purpose of this work, actions/tasks/events will be of
omission because it will be assumed that any error that takes place is not intentional. To
determine the human error by omission, apply the five-step SPAR-H analysis to each task.
The result of the SPAR-H analysis for each task is the HEP value for each task. The HEP
value represents the P(f) of that task given the impact of human error. Refer to [37] for the
SPAR-H worksheets and follow guidance as described. For the purpose of this work, the
At-Power worksheets will be utilized for a more conservative analysis. The five-step process
of the SPAR-H worksheets is as follows:
1. Categorize the task being assessed as “Diagnosis” and/or “Action”
2. Rate each PSF for the task being assessed
3. Calculate the PSF-Modified HEP for the task being assessed if applicable
4. Account for dependence of the task being assessed
5. For all completed tasks, calculate the the final HEP based on dependence between
tasks
Apply the first four steps of SPAR-H analysis to each task within the network task list.
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Once all tasks analyses are complete, follow step #5 and calculate the total network HEP as
instructed in the SPAR-H worksheets.
Example: HEP Calculation for Task A
Conduct a SPAR-H analysis on Task A. Follow the SPAR-H analysis guide in [37] for At-
Power conditions. First, Task A will be categorized and evaluated as a Diagnosis task and
an Action task to determine its HEP. Eight PSFs will then be rated for both the Diagnosis
HEP and Action HEP calculations with respect to Task A. Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the
chosen ratings and associated multipliers for each rated PSF and task dependency.
Table 3.4. Example Diagnosis PSF Ratings for Task A
PSF Level Multiplier






Fitness for Duty Nominal 1
Work Processes Good 0.5
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Table 3.5. Example Action PSF Ratings for Task A
PSF Level Multiplier






Fitness for Duty Nominal 1
Work Processes Good 0.5
Table 3.6. Example Task Dependency Rating for Task A
Dependency on Previous Task Final P(f)
Zero P(f) = HEP
Follow the calculation in the SPAR-H worksheets to include Diagnosis HEP, Action HEP,
and dependency categorization to determine the final HEP value for Task A. All final HEP
values for all five tasks are summarized in Table 3.7.
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3.1.6 Step 6: Choose the Appropriate Probability Distribution for Du-
ration Sampling
Review all possible types of probability distributions and choose the most appropriate
distribution for the work being assessed. For the purpose of this work, a continuous variable
(duration) will be monitored as well as its minimum/mean/maximum parameter values. The
probability distribution will determine stochastic duration times to be utilized in individual
task duration calculations. In [40], the following recommendations and descriptions of






Each tasks’ duration time will initially be based on mean duration values. Additionally, the
duration time will be depend on the SPAR-H analysis to determine if the task has a higher
P(f) or P(s) of completion. For evaluating a randomly generated or stochastic duration
values, an exponential probability distribution would best suit the P(f) analysis [40].
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3.1.7 Step 7: Find the Individual Stochastic Task Durations based on
chosen Probability Distribution
First, generate a random number based on the probability distribution chosen in Step #6 for
the task being completed. Use the mean duration time from Table 3.1 as the mean parameter.
Next, generate two probability distributions representing P(f) and P(f) of each task being
completed. Use Table 3.1’s minimum and maximum duration values as the mean parameter
values for the P(f) and P(f) distributions. The P(f) distribution will use the mean low, or
minimum duration value, as the mean input parameter. The P(s) distribution will use the
mean high, or maximum duration value, as the mean input parameter.
Compare the task’s generated random number against its HEP value found in Step #5.When
the generated random number is greater than the HEP value, apply the P(f) distribution to
find the task’s sample duration. When the generated random number is less than the HEP
value, apply the P(s) distribution.
Apply this process to each task in Table 3.1 to generate new sample duration values for each
task.
Example: Task A Duration Sample
Based on an exponential probability distribution and values from Table 3.7, calculate each
task’s sample duration. Table 3.8 summarizes a sample duration value set for each task or
node.
Table 3.8. Example: Probabilistic Sample Duration for each Task







3.1.8 Step 8: Find All Possible Task Network Paths and Duration
Create a network diagram that represents the task network in the precedence order as
determined in Step #4. To do this, refer to each task as a named node in sequential order.
Graphically demonstrate the precedence order with the named nodes and directional arrows.
Next, map out all possible network paths from beginning task to the end task. Record all
possible tasks that can be completed.
Example: Network Diagram with All Possible Paths
Referring to Step #4, create a network diagram using the network tasks. Starting with Task
“A,” three possible recovery paths can be taken to the final node, Task “F.” Figure 3.1 shows
the task network where three possible network paths exist: 1) ABCDF, 2) ADF, 3) AEF.
Figure 3.1. Recovery Procedure Task Network Diagram
For each possible path, calculate the total duration sum of all nodes within the path to
determine the path duration. Remember to use the stochastic sample duration values from
Step #7. To do this, refer to Table 3.8 and sum the duration values for the corresponding
nodes within the path name. For example, for path "ABCF," the duration calculation is
DA0C8>= = ,48ℎCC> +,48ℎCC> +,48ℎCC> .
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Table 3.9 shows all possible paths and their duration within the network. Note that the
duration values for each path are a summation of stochastic results for each task or node.





3.1.9 Step 9: Determine Critical Path and Duration of Task Network
Apply the CPM to identify the longest duration path from Step #7. The path with the longest
duration represents the critical path, that when completed, assures that all other tasks have
been completed as well. The critical path also identifies which tasks need to be completed
and monitored for successful recovery completion.
Example: Critical Path and Total Duration
Refer back to Table 3.9 and identify the path with the longest duration. The recovery
network’s critical path is AEF with a duration of 4.68 hours.
3.1.10 Step 10: Simulate and Analyze Component Recovery Results
Apply Steps #1-9 to determine the critical path and duration of a given microgrid recovery
task network. Apply a Monte Carlo Simulation of no less than 10,000 iterations so that
stronger and more meaningful results can be analyzed. By applying multiple iterations to
this simulation, duration samples can be randomly chosen to best predict the success of each
task, path, and ultimately, critical path of a network being assessed. Create the following
plots for further analysis and conclusions in Step #11.
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Plot #1: PDF for the Modeled Recovery Scenario
Create a histogram plot that shows the occurrence frequency of all 10,000 scenarios against
the continuous variable, recovery time, to produce a Probability Density Function (PDF).
Determine the bin that represents the highest frequency grouping and its associated recovery
time range. Figure 3.2 shows the desired PDF with the red highlight representing the most
common recovery time.
Figure 3.2. PDF for Modeled Recovery Scenario
Plot #2: All Possible Recovery Paths and Durations for 10,000 Iterations
Create a line plot that presents the relationship of each path and its duration over all iterations.
Set the input variable as each possible recovery path. Set the output variable to be each
path’s duration. Connect all data points in a line to represent each of the 10,000 iterations.
Determine the most common, longest duration, path of all scenarios. Do this by rounding
each scenario’s longest recovery time up to the nearest integer. Then find the most common
recovery time and the path that associates with it to determine the critical path. Figure 3.3
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displays all possible recovery paths and their durations over each of the 10,000 iterations.
This plot allows for the observation of shorter and longer recovery time points or ranges
that correlate to specific recovery paths. Paths that are of longer durations, or are shown as
greater recovery time points, will likely be critical paths for the recovery task network.
Figure 3.3. Duration Required to Recover a Component for 10,000 Modeled
Scenarios
Plot #3: PDF for Component Recovery’s Critical Path
Based off of the critical path determined in Plot #2, find the path duration for that path
amongst all 10,000 scenarios. Create a histogram plot that shows the occurrence frequency
of all 10,000 scenarios against the determined critical path recovery time to produce a PDF.
Determine the bin that represents the highest frequency grouping and its associated recovery
time range. Figure 3.2 shows the desired PDF with the red highlight representing the most
common recovery time.
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Figure 3.4. PDF for Component Recovery Critical Path
Assess Plot #1 and Plot #3 with Figure 3.5 to understand the distribution relationship
between paths and durations. Figure 3.5 is a PDF of a component’s reliability over time
with the red highlight representing the most common recovery time. As recovery time
increases, the P(f) increases while the P(s) decreases. Consider possible factors or reasons
that may attribute Plot #1 and Plot #3’s relationships to include SPAR-H PSFs.
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Figure 3.5. PDF of Component Reliability over Recovery Time
3.1.11 Step 11: Conduct and Analyze a BOE Total Duration Calcula-
tion for a Multi-Component Failure Event
Select microgrid component(s) to be assessed within a total microgrid restoration event.
Develop a BOE calculation for the total microgrid system recovery duration. The calculation
should summate individual component duration times for how ever many components are
chosen to be degraded or failed. The individual duration times should correlate to the
component’s iterated duration values from Step #10. Analyze total system recovery time
and what factors led to it.
This methodology establishes the HPIRA tool that determines recovery times for the most
successful critical recovery paths within a recovery process task network. The HPIRA tool
will be applied to six microgrid component recovery efforts in Chapter 4. Resulting recovery
times will be considered man-hours needed for a successful microgrid recovery effort.
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3.2 Chapter Summary
This chapter described the 11-step methodology process to determine if human factors
impact the rebound, or recovery time, of a degraded microgrid. Within the methodology
process, the HPIRA tool was developed to assess the recovery of various microgrid com-
ponent failures or degradations. The output metric of the HPIRA tool is the total recovery
time or man-hours required to recover a microgrid system. Chapter 4 will apply the HPIRA




The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the HPIRA tool for various microgrid
recovery scenarios. In this chapter, the research methodology as described in Chapter 3 will
be applied to answer the original thesis question. The HPIRA tool will produce compara-
ble recovery time statistics of different microgrid components to show how human factors
affects a microgrid recovery process. Additionally, it will present the P(s) versus P(f) for
a microgrid system recovery. The research question will be analysed in two perspectives:
1) The influence of human factors on individual microgrid component recovery processes
and 2) The influence of human factors on a multi-scale microgrid component recovery
process. The results will be analyzed to provide meaningful conclusions and recommenda-
tions for microgrid system recovery. This research utilizes firsthand, user data inputs from
experienced microgrid recovery personnel.
4.1 Individual Microgrid Component Recovery
Themethodology developed inChapter 3 simulate individual component recovery processes
to restore a microgrid to normal operations. Exponential distributions are selected to model
P(f) and P(s) of all tasks within all generated network paths since theymeasure a continuous,
random variable with high and low parameter values. Six individual microgrid component
recoveries will be evaluated with the HPIRA tool: Downed Pole, Generator, Substation,
Multicell Battery, PV, and Rechargeable Battery. The data for each component recoery
model is based off of firsthand knowledge from [32] to determine an appropriate recovery
task list and task order precedence. All tasks are representative recovery actions that are
found in [33].
We assume the following about the recovery scenario and team for each component recovery
model and analysis. The component analyzed is part of a NAVSTA microgrid. It is the only
component to fail. The indecent of failure is unintentional and specific to a single microgrid
component. The recovery team is a fully qualified and rested 2-person team consisting of
a High Voltage Supervisor and a Lead Electrician. Environmental conditions will be ideal
and all tools and supplies are available and in supply.
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4.1.1 Downed Pole Recovery
For the downed pole recovery process, 18 recovery tasks, as shown in Table A.1, will be
simulated as a recovery task network. The recovery task list includes all tasks and durations
in Table 4.1. The recovery procedure task list identifies all tasks sequentially from Task “A”
to Task “S.” Appendix A provides the generated precedence list of all tasks in Table A.2.
Table 4.1. Downed Pole Recovery Procedure Task List and Durations (hr)
Task Min Max Mean Follow On Task
A 0.15 0.25 0.20 B
B 0.17 0.25 0.21 C, D
C 0.22 0.30 0.26 E
D 0.17 0.25 0.21 E
E 0.17 0.33 0.25 F
F 0.33 0.50 0.42 G, H
G 0.17 0.33 0.25 J
H 0.17 0.25 0.21 I
I 0.25 0.33 0.29 J
J 0.50 1.00 0.75 K, L
K 0.25 0.33 0.29 L
L 2.50 3.50 3.00 M, N
M 1.50 2.50 2.00 N
N 3.00 4.00 3.50 O
O 3.50 4.50 4.00 Q, P
P 0.17 0.25 0.21 R
Q 0.17 0.25 0.21 R
R 0.25 0.33 0.29 S
S 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 13.62 19.47 16.54
From the task list and task precedence order, 32 possible recovery paths can be taken from
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the beginning node to the end, or “recovered,” node. Based on the 10,000 iterated scenarios
through the HPIRA tool, 10,000 path recovery sample times are produced for each of the
32 paths. Appendix A displays Table A.3 which shows all 32 possible paths and the first
five, of the 10,000, recovery sample times within the network. Figure 4.1 shows the downed
pole recovery task network with all tasks represented as alphabetical nodes and all potential
recovery paths from start to completion.
By implementing CPM process to the downed pole recovery network, the path that sig-
nificantly impacts a recovery’s progression can be identified. Within the task network,
individual task completions occur in a single direction as either parallel or in series. Not
one single path represents all tasks to be completed for a full downed pole recovery. Instead,
each path represents specific tasks that, when taken in order, are subject to the successful
completion and length of completion time of each prior task. The path with the longest
duration, or recovery time, is the critical path. The critical path represents the combination
of the most complicated tasks and longest task recovery times that are involved within a
microgrid system’s recovery process. The critical path is important to identify because if
any delay or obstruction occurs to the tasks within the path, the longest recovery duration
will only be extended and will delay the successful restoration of the microgrid and the
services it supports.
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Figure 4.1. Downed Pole Recovery Network Diagram
Figure 4.2 displays a PDF for the modeled downed pole recovery simulation. The plot
summarizes the longest recovery times of each of the 10,000 scenarios by how often they
occurred. Plotting the occurrence frequency against the continuous variable, recovery time,
produces a PDF where the P(s) and P(f) of the downed pole recovery can be assessed with
respect to recovery time. In Figure 4.2, the red highlighted bin represents the most occurred
grouping of the longest path recovery times.
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Figure 4.2. PDF for the Modeled Downed Pole Recovery Process. The Most
Frequent Scenario Frequency Grouping is 606 of 10,000 Scenarios. The Mode
Recovery Time Range is 13.0 to 14.0 Hours with a 0.06 Probability of Oc-
currence.
The greatest frequency occurrence bin represents the highest P(s) for a downed pole recovery.
Therefore, the most successful restoration paths will take approximately between between
13.0 to 14.0 hours to complete. Restoration path recovery times range from a minimum
recovery time of 3.70 hours and to a maximum recovery time of 63.56 hours. Referring
back to Figure 3.5, the P(s) and P(f) of recovery processes can be estimated in respect to the
system’s recovery time. For a downed pole recovery, paths with recovery times that range
between 3.70 hours to 13.0 hours have a higher likelihood of success than failure. Paths
with recovery times closer to 13.0 hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while paths that
fall near the minimum recovery time have a lower P(s). In opposite, paths that range from
14.0 hours to 63.56 hours have a higher likelihood of failure than success. Similar to the
success ranges, path recovery times that fall near 14.0 hours have a less likely chance to fail,
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but as the maximum recovery time of 63.56 hours is approached, the likelihood of failure
increases.
After conducting the modeled recovery of 10,000 downed pole recovery scenarios, all of
the 10,000 longest recovery times were found to fall between 3.70 and 63.56 hours. Table
4.2 compares statistical values between the predicted and modeled recovery scenarios. The
predicted modeled scenario is based off of the initial task list that does not consider human
error or task precedence. Since the modeled recovery scenario utilized is based off of
SPAR-H analysis and is of stochastic nature, the values are expected to vary considerably
from predicted values.
Table 4.2. Recovery Time Statistics for Downed Pole Recovery
Recovery Scenario Min Max Mean SD Var
Predicted 13.62 19.48 16.54 4.14 17.11
Model 3.70 63.56 18.91 7.54 56.90
The modeled downed pole recovery simulation produces the longest recovery time for 32
possible recovery paths for 10,000 scenarios. Figure 4.3 shows these outputs with common
trends. In Figure 4.3, high and low recovery time ranges occur over certain recovery paths.
Paths #1 to #8 and paths #17 to #24 produce the highest recovery time ranges that represent
potential critical recovery paths.
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Figure 4.3. Duration Required to Recover a Downed Pole for 10,000 Modeled
Scenarios
For the purpose of this work, paths with high peaks or ranges are most important since they
likely represent critical paths. Paths #1 to #8 and paths #17 to #24 include certain tasks that
lead to longer recovery times. This can be due to task complexity and long task recovery
times.When these tasks are combined, factors such as complexity and task completion times
drive the elongation of total recovery time. Critical paths drive the successful completion
of the recovery network or process. When assessing all 10,000 downed pole scenarios, Path
#18 was determined to be the most common critical path. Figure 4.4 identifies the Downed
Pole Recovery Network critical path, Path #18, and the path’s associated recovery time. The
nodes specified within that path are of significance since they have the greatest potential
to slow down the recovery process. The recovery process is dependent on the critical path
since the recovery completion is only as fast as the longest timed path within the recovery
network. The longest recovery time durations are estimated to the nearest hour in order to
determine mode value, or most frequent recovery time, that existed. The modeled recovery
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time mode was determined to be 16 hours. Based off of the mode value, Path #18 is the
critical path for the downed pole recovery model. It is important to note that the critical
path is not necessarily the critical path for all of the pole recovery scenarios; however, it
does dominate over the other potential paths.
Figure 4.4. Downed Pole Recovery Network Diagram Showing the Critical
Recovery Path #18 with an Estimated Recovery Time of 16 Hours.
With the critical path identified, the recovery time for that path was compared amongst
all 10,000 recovery scenarios. Figure 4.5 is a PDF summarizing the relationship between
all 10,000 recovery times and how often they occurred. This plot allows for assessment of
whether Path #18 has a higher likelihood of success or failure in respect to recovery time.
Figure 4.5 identifies the most occurred grouping of the 10,000 critical path recovery times
with the red highlighted bin.
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Figure 4.5. PDF for the Modeled Downed Pole Recovery Path #18. The
Most Frequent Scenario Frequency Grouping is 605 of 10,000 Scenarios. The
Mode Recovery Time Range is 13.0 to 14.0 Hours with a 0.06 Probability
of Occurrence.
For the downed pole critical recovery path, Path #18, recovery times that fall under 13.0
hours have a have a higher likelihood of success than failure. Paths with recovery times
closer to 13.0 hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while shorter paths have a lower
P(s). In opposite, paths that range from 14.0 hours or longer have a higher likelihood of
failure than success. Similar to the success ranges, path recovery times that fall near 14.0
hours have a less likely chance to fail, but as the path’s recovery time increases so does its
likelihood of failure.
4.1.2 Generator Recovery
For the generator recovery process, 16 recovery tasks, as shown in Table B.1, will be
simulated in the recovery task network. The task list includes all tasks and durations in
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Table 4.3. The recovery procedure task list identifies all tasks sequentially from Task “A” to
Task “Q.” Appendix B provides the generated precedence list of the task list in Table B.2.
Table 4.3. Generator Recovery Procedure Task List and Durations (hr)
Task Min Max Mean Follow On Task
A 0.15 0.25 0.20 B
B 0.17 0.25 0.21 C
C 0.08 0.12 0.10 D,E
D 0.08 0.12 0.10 F
E 0.42 0.67 0.54 F
F 0.25 0.50 0.38 G
G 0.42 0.67 0.54 H,I
H 0.17 0.33 0.25 J
I 0.17 0.33 0.25 J
J 0.17 0.25 0.21 K
K 0.25 0.33 0.29 L
L 6.00 12.00 9.00 M,N
M 0.25 0.50 0.38 P
N 0.17 0.25 0.21 O
O 0.33 0.50 0.42 Q
P 0.33 0.50 0.42 Q
Q 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 9.40 17.57 13.48
From the task list and task precedence order, eight possible recovery paths can be taken
from the beginning node to the end, or “recovered,” node. Based on the 10,000 iterated
scenarios through the HPIRA tool, 10,000 path recovery sample times are produced for
each of the eight paths. Appendix B displays Table B.3 which shows all eight possible paths
and the first five, of the 10,000, recovery sample times within the network. Figure 4.6 shows
the generator recovery task network with all tasks represented as alphabetical nodes and all
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potential recovery paths from start to completion. Like the downed pole task network, the
generator recovery network’s critical path is determined with the same CPM process.
Figure 4.6. Generator Recovery Network Diagram
Figure 4.7 displays a PDF for the modeled generator recovery simulation. The plot summa-
rizes the longest recovery times of each of the 10,000 scenarios by how often they occurred.
Plotting the occurrence frequency against the continuous variable, recovery time, produces
a PDF where the P(s) and P(f) of the generator recovery can be assessed with respect to
recovery time. In Figure 4.7, the red highlighted bin represents the most occurred grouping
of the 10,000 critical path recovery times.
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Figure 4.7. PDF for the Modeled Generator Recovery Process. The Most Fre-
quent Scenario Frequency Grouping is 629 of 10,000 Scenarios. The Mode
Recovery Time Range is 8.0 to 9.0 Hours with a 0.06 Probability of Occur-
rence.
The greatest frequency occurrence bin represents the highest P(s) for a generator recovery.
Therefore, the most successful critical restoration paths will take approximately between
between 8.0 to 9.0 hours to complete. The critical restoration path recovery times range
from a minimum recovery time of 1.79 hours and at a maximum recovery time of 121.8
hours. Referring back to Figure 3.5, the P(s) and P(f) of recovery processes can be estimated
in respect to the system’s recovery time. For a generator recovery, paths with recovery times
that range between 1.79 hours to 8.0 hours have a higher likelihood of success than failure.
Paths with recovery times closer to 8.0 hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while paths
that fall near the minimum recovery time have a lower P(s). In opposite, paths that range
from 9.0 hours to 121.8 hours have a higher likelihood of failure than success. Similar to
the success ranges, path recovery times that fall near 9.0 hours have a less likely chance
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to fail, but as the maximum recovery time of 121.8 hours is approached, the likelihood of
failure increases.
After conducting the modeled recovery of 10,000 generator recovery scenarios, all of the
10,000 longest recovery times were found to fall between 1.79 and 121.8 hours. Table 4.4
compares statistical values between the predicted and modeled recovery scenarios. Like the
downed pole recovery scenarios, modeled recovery values are based off of SPAR-H analysis
and are of stochastic nature, resulting in values that are expected to vary considerably from
predicted values.
Table 4.4. Recovery Time Statistics for Generator Recovery
Recovery Scenario Min Max Mean SD Var
Predicted 9.40 17.57 13.48 5.77 33.35
Model 1.79 121.8 16.55 11.92 142.1
Themodeled recovery scenario produced eight possible network paths with 10,000 recovery
times for each path. Figure 4.8 shows these outputs with common trends. In Figure 4.8 there
are no significant high or low peaks or ranges of recovery times for certain recovery paths.
With no paths showing significantly higher recovery times than others, all recovery paths
have the potential to be considered critical recovery paths.
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Figure 4.8. Duration Required to Recover a Generator for 10,000 Modeled
Scenarios
Critical paths drive the successful completion of the recovery network or process. When
assessing all 10,000 generator recovery scenarios, Path #7 was determined to be the most
common critical path. Figure 4.9 identifies the Generator Recovery Network critical path,
Path #7, and the path’s associated recovery time. Based off of the most common, longest
recovery time, Path #7 is the critical path for the generator recovery model. It is important to
note that the critical path is not necessarily the critical path for all of the generator recovery
scenarios; however, it does dominate over the other potential paths.
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Figure 4.9. Generator Recovery Network Diagram Showing the Critical Re-
covery Path #7 with an Estimated Recovery Time of 7 Hours.
With the critical path identified, the recovery time for that path was compared amongst
all 10,000 recovery scenarios. Figure 4.10 is a PDF summarizing the relationship between
all 10,000 recovery times and how often they occurred. This plot allows for assessment of
whether Path #7 has a higher likelihood of success or failure in respect to recovery time.
Figure 4.10 identifies the most occurred grouping of the 10,000 critical path recovery times
with the red highlighted bin.
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Figure 4.10. PDF for the Modeled Generator Recovery Path #7. The Most
Frequent Scenario Frequency Grouping is 632 of 10,000 Scenarios. The Mode
Recovery Time Range is 6.0 to 7.0 Hours with a 0.06 Probability of Occur-
rence.
For the generator critical recovery path, Path #7, recovery times that fall under 6.0 hours
have a have a higher likelihood of success than failure. Paths with recovery times closer
to 6.0 hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while shorter paths have a lower P(s). In
opposite, paths that range from 7.0 hours or longer have a higher likelihood of failure than
success. Similar to the success ranges, path recovery times that fall near 7.0 hours have a
less likely chance to fail, but as the path’s recovery time increases so does its likelihood of
failure.
4.1.3 Substation Recovery
For the substation recovery process, 18 recovery tasks, as shown in Table C.1, will be
simulated in the recovery task network. The task list includes all tasks and durations in
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Table 4.5. The recovery procedure task list identifies all tasks sequentially from Task “A” to
Task “S.” Appendix C provides the generated precedence list of the task list in Table C.2.
Table 4.5. Substation Recovery Procedure Task List and Durations (hr)
Task Min Max Mean Follow On Task
A 0.15 0.25 0.20 B
B 0.17 0.25 0.21 C
C 0.17 0.25 0.21 D,F
D 0.25 0.33 0.29 E
E 0.25 0.33 0.29 G
F 0.33 0.50 0.42 G
G 0.17 0.33 0.25 H,I
H 0.17 0.33 0.25 J
I 0.17 0.25 0.21 J
J 0.25 0.33 0.29 K,N
K 0.42 0.58 0.50 L
L 2.00 3.00 2.50 M
M 0.25 0.50 0.38 O
N 8.00 11.00 9.50 O
O 1.50 2.50 2.00 P
P 0.25 0.50 0.38 Q
Q 0.17 0.25 0.21 R
R 0.33 0.50 0.42 S
S 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 14.98 22.00 18.49
From the task list and task precedence order, eight possible recovery paths can be taken
from the beginning node to the end, or “recovered,” node. Based on the 10,000 iterated
scenarios through the HPIRA tool, 10,000 path recovery sample times are produced for
each of the eight paths. Appendix C displays Table C.3 which shows all eight possible paths
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and the first five, of the 10,000, recovery sample times within the network. Figure 4.11
shows the substation recovery task network with all tasks represented as alphabetical nodes
and all potential recovery paths from start to completion. Like the the previous recovery
task networks, the substation recovery network’s critical path is determined with the same
CPM process.
Figure 4.11. Substation Recovery Network Diagram
Figure 4.12 displays a PDF for themodeled substation recovery simulation. The plot summa-
rizes the longest recovery times of each of the 10,000 scenarios by how often they occurred.
Plotting the occurrence frequency against the continuous variable, recovery time, produces
a PDF where the P(s) and P(f) of the substation recovery can be assessed with respect to
recovery time. In Figure 4.12, the red highlighted bin represents the most occurred grouping
of the 10,000 critical path recovery times.
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Figure 4.12. PDF for the Modeled Substation Recovery Process. The Most
Frequent Scenario Frequency Grouping is 502 of 10,000 Scenarios. The Mode
Recovery Time Range is 11.0 to 12.0 Hours with a 0.05 Probability of Oc-
currence.
The greatest frequency occurrence bin represents the greatest P(s) for a substation recovery.
Therefore, the most successful critical restoration paths will take approximately between
between 11.0 to 12.0 hours to complete. The critical restoration path recovery times range
from a minimum recovery time of 3.49 hours and a maximum recovery time of 124.5 hours.
Referring back to Figure 3.5, the P(s) and P(f) of recovery processes can be estimated in
respect to the system’s recovery time. For a substation recovery, paths with recovery times
that range between 3.49 hours to 11.0 hours have a higher likelihood of success than failure.
Paths with recovery times closer to 11.0 hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while paths
that fall near the minimum recovery time have a lower P(s). In opposite, paths that range
from 12.0 hours to 124.5 hours have a higher likelihood of failure than success. Similar to
the success ranges, path recovery times that fall near 12.0 hours have a less likely chance
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to fail, but as the maximum recovery time of 124.5 hours is approached, the likelihood of
failure increases.
After conducting the modeled recovery of 10,000 substation recovery scenarios, all of the
10,000 longest recovery times were found to fall between 3.49 and 124.5 hours. Table 4.6
compares statistical values between the predicted and modeled recovery scenarios. Like the
previous recovery scenarios, modeled recovery values are based off of SPAR-H analysis
and are of stochastic nature, resulting in values that are expected to vary considerably from
predicted values.
Table 4.6. Recovery Time Statistics for Substation Recovery
Recovery Scenario Min Max Mean SD Var
Predicted 14.98 22.00 18.49 4.96 24.62
Model 3.49 124.5 28.85 11.64 135.4
Themodeled recovery scenario produced eight possible network paths with 10,000 recovery
times for each path. Figure 4.13 shows these outputs with common trends. In Figure 4.13
high and low recovery time ranges occur amongst certain recovery paths. Paths #1 to #4
produce high recovery time ranges that represent potential critical recovery paths.
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Figure 4.13. Duration Required to Recover a Substation for 10,000 Modeled
Scenarios
Critical paths drive the successful completion of the recovery network or process. When
assessing all 10,000 substation recovery scenarios, Path #3 was determined to be the most
common critical path. Figure 4.14 identifies the Substation Recovery Network critical path,
Path #3, and the path’s associated recovery time. Based off of the most common, longest
recovery time, Path #3 is the critical path for the substation recoverymodel. It is important to
note that the critical path is not necessarily the critical path for all of the generator recovery
scenarios; however, it does dominate over the other potential paths.
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Figure 4.14. Substation Recovery Network Diagram Showing the Critical
Recovery Path #3 with an Estimated Recovery Time of 12 Hours.
With the critical path identified, the recovery time for that path was compared amongst
all 10,000 recovery scenarios. Figure 4.15 is a PDF summarizing the relationship between
all 10,000 recovery times and how often they occurred. This plot allows for assessment of
whether Path #3 has a higher likelihood of success or failure in respect to recovery time.
Figure 4.15 identifies the most occurred grouping of the 10,000 critical path recovery times
with the red highlighted bin.
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Figure 4.15. PDF for Substation Recovery Path #3. The Most Frequent
Scenario Frequency Grouping is 519 of 10,000 Scenarios. The Mode Recovery
Time Range is 11.0 to 12.0 Hours with a 0.05 Probability of Occurrence.
For the substation critical recovery path, Path #3, recovery times that fall under 11.0 hours
have a have a higher likelihood of success than failure. Paths with recovery times closer to
11.0 hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while paths that fall near the minimum recovery
time have a lower P(s). In opposite, paths that range from 12.0 hours or longer have a higher
likelihood of failure than success. Similar to the success ranges, path recovery times that
fall near 12.0 hours have a less likely chance to fail, but as recovery time increases so does
the likelihood of failure.
4.1.4 PV Recovery
For the PV recovery process, 13 recovery tasks, as shown in Table D.1, will be simulated
in the recovery task network. The task list includes all tasks and durations are presented in
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Table 4.7. The recovery procedure task list identifies all tasks sequentially from Task “A” to
Task “N.” Appendix D provides the generated precedence list of the task list in Table D.2.
Table 4.7. PV Recovery Procedure Task List and Durations (hr)
Task Min Max Mean Follow On Task
A 0.15 0.25 0.20 B
B 0.17 0.25 0.21 C
C 0.17 0.33 0.25 D,E
D 1.50 3.50 2.50 G
E 0.17 0.33 0.25 F
F 0.17 0.33 0.25 G
G 0.08 0.17 0.13 H,I
H 0.42 0.58 0.50 J
I 0.25 0.33 0.29 K
J 0.50 0.67 0.58 K
K 0.25 0.50 0.38 L
L 0.17 0.25 0.21 M
M 0.33 0.50 0.42 N
N 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 4.32 8.00 6.16
From the task list and task precedence order, four possible recovery paths can be taken from
the beginning node to the end, or “recovered,” node. Based on the 10,000 iterated scenarios
through the HPIRA tool, 10,000 path recovery sample times are produced for each of teh
four paths. Appendix D displays Table D.3 which shows all four possible paths and the
first five, of the 10,000, recovery sample times within the network. Figure 4.16 shows the
PV recovery task network with all tasks represented as alphabetical nodes and all potential
recovery paths from start to completion. Like the the previous recovery task networks, the
PV recovery network’s critical path is determined with the same CPM process.
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Figure 4.16. PV Recovery Network Diagram
Figure 4.17 displays a PDF for the modeled PV recovery simulation. The plot summarizes
the longest recovery times of each of the 10,000 scenarios by how often they occurred.
Plotting the occurrence frequency against the continuous variable, recovery time, produces
a PDF where the P(s) and P(f) of the PV recovery can be assessed with respect to recovery
time. In Figure 4.17, the red highlighted bin represents the most occurred grouping of the
10,000 critical path recovery times.
63
Figure 4.17. PDF for the Modeled PV Recovery Process. The Most Frequent
Scenario Frequency Grouping is 1,739 of 10,000 Scenarios. The Mode Re-
covery Time Range is 4.0 to 5.0 Hours with a 0.17 Probability of Occurrence.
The greatest frequency occurrence bin represents the greatest P(s) for a PV recovery.
Therefore, the most successful critical restoration paths will take between between four to
5.0 hours to complete. The critical restoration path recovery times range from a minimum
recovery time of 1.06 hours and a maximum recovery time of 41.77 hours. Referring back
to Figure 3.5, the P(s) and P(f) of recovery processes can be estimated in respect to the
system’s recovery time. For a PV recovery, paths with recovery times that range between
1.06 hours to four hours have a higher likelihood of success than failure. Paths with recovery
times closer to four hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while paths that fall near the
minimum recovery time have a lower P(s). In opposite, paths that range from 5.0 hours to
41.77 hours have a higher likelihood of failure than success. Similar to the success ranges,
path recovery times that fall near 5.0 hours have a less likely chance to fail, but as the
maximum recovery time of 41.77 hours is approached, the likelihood of failure increases.
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After conducting the modeled recovery of 10,000 PV scenarios, all 10,000 generated critical
path recovery times fell between 1.06 and 41.77 hours. Table 4.8 compares statistical values
between the predicted andmodeled recovery scenarios. Like the previous recovery scenarios,
modeled recovery values are based off of SPAR-H analysis and are of stochastic nature,
resulting in values that are expected to vary considerably from predicted values.
Table 4.8. Recovery Time Statistics for PV Recovery
Recovery Scenario Min Max Mean SD Var
Predicted 4.32 8.00 6.16 2.60 6.78
Model 1.06 41.77 6.70 3.67 13.49
The modeled recovery scenario produced four possible network paths with 10,000 recovery
times for each path. Figure 4.18 shows these outputs with common trends. In Figure 4.18
high and low recovery time instances occur amongst certain recovery paths. Paths #2 and #4
tend to produce the highest recovery time ranges that represent potential critical recovery
paths.
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Figure 4.18. Duration Required to Recover a PV for 10,000 Modeled Sce-
narios
Critical paths drive the successful completion of the recovery network or process. When
assessing all 10,000 PV scenarios, Path #4 was determined to be the most common critical
path. Figure 4.19 identifies the PV Recovery Network critical path, Path #4, and the path’s
associated recovery time. Based off of the most common, longest recovery time, Path #4 is
the critical path for the PV recovery model. It is important to note that the most common
critical path is not necessarily the critical path for all of the pole recovery scenarios; however,
it does dominate over the other potential paths.
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Figure 4.19. PV Recovery Network Diagram Showing the Critical Recovery
Path #4 with an Estimated Recovery Time of 3 Hours.
With the critical path identified, the recovery time for that path was compared amongst
all 10,000 recovery scenarios. Figure 4.20 is a PDF summarizing the relationship between
all 10,000 recovery times and how often they occurred. This plot allows for assessment of
whether Path #4 has a higher likelihood of success or failure in respect to recovery time.
Figure 4.20 identifies the most occurred grouping of the 10,000 critical path recovery times
with the red highlighted bin.
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Figure 4.20. PDF PV Recovery Path #4. The Most Frequent Scenario Fre-
quency Grouping is 3,136 of 10,000 Scenarios. The Mode Recovery Time
Range is 3.0 to 4.0 Hours with a 0.31 Probability of Occurrence.
For the PV critical recovery path, Path #4, recovery times that fall under 3.0 hours have
a have a higher likelihood of success than failure. Paths with recovery times closer to 3.0
hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while paths that fall near the minimum recovery
time have a lower P(s). In opposite, paths that range from 4.0 hours or longer have a higher
likelihood of failure than success. Similar to the success ranges, path recovery times that
fall near 4.0 hours have a less likely chance to fail, but as recovery time increases so does
the likelihood of failure.
4.1.5 Rechargeable Battery Recovery
For the rechargeable battery recovery process, 13 recovery tasks, as shown in Table E.1,
will be simulated in the recovery task network. The task list includes all tasks and durations
are presented in Table 4.9. The recovery procedure task list identifies all tasks sequentially
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from Task “A” to Task “N.” Appendix E provides the generated precedence list of the task
list in Table E.2.
Table 4.9. Rechargeable Battery Recovery Procedure Task List and Durations
(hr)
Task Min Max Mean Follow On Task
A 0.15 0.25 0.20 B,C
B 0.17 0.25 0.21 D
C 0.25 0.33 0.29 D
D 0.17 0.33 0.25 E,F
E 0.17 0.33 0.25 G
F 0.25 0.33 0.29 G
G 0.17 0.25 0.21 H
H 0.33 0.50 0.42 I
I 0.50 0.75 0.63 J
J 3.00 4.00 3.50 K,L
K 0.25 0.33 0.29 M
L 0.33 0.50 0.42 M
M 0.08 0.17 0.13 N
N 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 5.82 8.33 7.08
From the task list and task precedence order, eight possible recovery paths can be taken from
the beginning node to the end, or “recovered,” node. Based on the 10,000 iterated scenarios
through the HPIRA tool, 10,000 path recovery sample times are produced for each of the
eight paths. Appendix E displays Table E.3 which shows all eight possible paths and the
first five, of the 10,000, recovery sample times within the network. Figure 4.21 shows the
rechargeable battery recovery task network with all tasks represented as alphabetical nodes
and all potential recovery paths from start to completion. Like the the previous recovery
task networks, the rechargeable battery recovery network’s critical path is determined with
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the same CPM process.
Figure 4.21. Rechargeable Battery Recovery Network Diagram
Figure 4.22 displays a PDF for the modeled rechargeable battery recovery simulation. The
plot summarizes the relationship between all 10,000 critical path recovery times and how
often they occurred. Plotting the occurrence frequency against the continuous variable,
recovery time, produces a PDF where the P(s) and P(f) of the downed pole recovery can be
assessed with respect to recovery time. In Figure 4.22, the red highlighted bin represents
the most occurred grouping of the 10,000 critical path recovery times.
70
Figure 4.22. PDF for the Modeled Rechargeable Battery Recovery Process.
The Most Frequent Scenario Frequency Grouping is 1,404 of 10,000 Sce-
narios. The Mode Recovery Time Range is 5.0 to 6.0 Hours with a 0.14
Probability of Occurrence.
The greatest frequency occurrence bin represents the greatest P(s) for a rechargeable battery
recovery. Therefore, the most successful critical restoration paths will take approximately
between between 5.0 to 6.0 hours to complete. The critical restoration path recovery times
range from a minimum recovery time of 1.38 hours and a maximum recovery time of 47.40
hours. Referring back to Figure 3.5, the P(s) and P(f) of recovery processes can be estimated
in respect to the system’s recovery time. For a rechargeable battery recovery, paths with
recovery times that range between 1.38 hours to 5.0 hours have a higher likelihood of
success than failure. Paths with recovery times closer to 5.0 hours have the highest P(s)
of recovery while paths that fall near the minimum recovery time have a lower P(s). In
opposite, paths that range from 6.0 hours to 47.40 hours have a higher likelihood of failure
than success. Similar to the success ranges, path recovery times that fall near 6.0 hours have
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a less likely chance to fail, but as the maximum recovery time of 47.40 hours is approached,
the likelihood of failure increases.
After conducting the modeled recovery of 10,000 rechargeable battery scenarios, all 10,000
longest recovery times fell between 1.38 and 47.40 hours. Table 4.10 compares statistical
values between the predicted and modeled recovery scenarios. Like the downed pole re-
covery scenarios, modeled recovery values are based off of SPAR-H analysis and are of
stochastic nature, resulting in values that are expected to vary considerably from predicted
values.
Table 4.10. Recovery Time Statistics for Rechargeable Battery Recovery
Recovery Scenario Min Max Mean SD Var
Predicted 5.82 8.33 7.08 1.78 3.17
Model 1.38 47.40 7.82 4.35 18.93
Themodeled recovery scenario produced eight possible network paths with 10,000 recovery
times for each path. Figure 4.23 shows these outputs with common trends. In Figure 4.8
there are no significant high or low peaks or ranges of recovery times for certain recovery
paths. With no paths showing significantly higher recovery times than others, all recovery
paths have the potential to be considered critical recovery paths.
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Figure 4.23. Duration Required to Recover a Rechargeable Battery for 10,000
Modeled Scenarios
Critical paths drive the successful completion of the recovery network or process. When
assessing all 10,000 rechargeable battery recovery scenarios, Path #1 was determined to be
the most common critical path. Figure 4.24 identifies the Rechargeable Battery Recovery
Network critical path, Path #1, and the path’s associated recovery time. Based off of the
most common, longest recovery time, Path #1 is the critical path for the rechargeable battery
recovery model. It is important to note that the critical path is not necessarily the critical
path for all of the generator recovery scenarios; however, it does dominate over the other
potential paths.
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Figure 4.24. Rechargeable Battery Recovery Network Diagram Showing the
Critical Recovery Path #1 with an Estimated Recovery Time of 5 Hours.
With the critical path identified, the recovery time for that path was compared amongst
all 10,000 recovery scenarios. Figure 4.25 is a PDF summarizing the relationship between
all 10,000 recovery times and how often they occurred. This plot allows for assessment of
whether Path #1 has a higher likelihood of success or failure in respect to recovery time.
Figure 4.25 identifies the most occurred grouping of the 10,000 critical path recovery times
with the red highlighted bin.
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Figure 4.25. PDF of Rechargeable Battery Recovery Path #1. The Most
Frequent Scenario Frequency Grouping is 1,385 of 10,000 Scenarios. The
Mode Recovery Time Range is 4.0 to 5.0 Hours with a 0.14 Probability of
Occurrence.
For the rechargeable battery critical recovery path, Path #1, recovery times that fall under
4.0 hours have a have a higher likelihood of success than failure. Paths with recovery times
closer to 4.0 hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while paths that fall near the minimum
recovery time have a lower P(s). In opposite, paths that range from 5.0 hours or longer have
a higher likelihood of failure than success. Similar to the success ranges, path recovery
times that fall near 5.0 hours have a less likely chance to fail, but as recovery time increases
so does the likelihood of failure.
4.1.6 Mutlicell Battery Recovery
For this recovery process, 12 recovery tasks, as shown in Table F.1, will be simulated in the
recovery task network. The task list includes all tasks and durations are presented in Table
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4.11. The recovery procedure task list identifies all tasks sequentially from Task “A” to Task
“M.” Appendix F provides the generated precedence list of the task list in Table F.2.
Table 4.11. Multicell Battery Recovery Procedure Task List and Durations
(hr)
Task Min Max Mean Follow On Task
A 0.15 0.25 0.20 B
B 0.17 0.25 0.21 C
C 0.17 0.33 0.25 D,E
D 0.17 0.33 0.25 F
E 0.08 0.25 0.17 F
F 0.17 0.25 0.21 G
G 0.25 0.33 0.29 H,I
H 0.08 0.17 0.13 J
I 0.08 0.17 0.13 J
J 24.00 48.00 36.00 K
K 0.08 0.25 0.17 L
L 0.17 0.25 0.21 M
M 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 25.57 50.83 38.20
From the task list and task precedence order, four possible recovery paths can be taken from
the beginning node to the end, or “recovered,” node. Based on the 10,000 iterated scenarios
through the HPIRA tool, 10,000 path recovery sample times are produced for each of the
four paths. Appendix F displays Table F.3 which shows all four possible paths and the
first five, of the 10,000, recovery sample times within the network. Figure 4.26 shows the
multicell battery recovery task network with all tasks represented as alphabetical nodes and
all potential recovery paths from start to completion. Like the the previous recovery task
networks, the multicell battery recovery network’s critical path is determined with the same
CPM process.
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Figure 4.26 shows the task network for the recovery procedure task list.
Figure 4.26. Multicell Battery Recovery Network Diagram
Figure 4.27 displays a PDF for the modeled multicell battery recovery simulation. The plot
summarizes the relationship between all 10,000 critical path recovery times and how often
they occurred. Plotting the occurrence frequency against the continuous variable, recovery
time, produces a PDF where the P(s) and P(f) of the downed pole recovery can be assessed
with respect to recovery time.
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Figure 4.27. PDF for the Modeled Multicell Battery Recovery Process. The
Most Frequent Scenario Frequency Grouping is 208 of 10,000 Scenarios. The
Mode Recovery Time Range is 5.0 to 6.0 Hours with a 0.02 Probability of
Occurrence.
The greatest frequency occurrence bin represents the greatest P(s) for a multicell battery
recovery. Therefore, the most successful critical restoration paths will take approximately
between between 5.0 to 6.0 hours to complete. The critical restoration path recovery times
range from a minimum recovery time of 1.10 hours and a maximum recovery time of 506.5
hours. Referring back to Figure 3.5, the P(s) and P(f) of recovery processes can be estimated
in respect to the system’s recovery time. For amulticell battery recovery, paths with recovery
times that range between 1.10 hours to 5.0 hours have a higher likelihood of success than
failure. Paths with recovery times closer to 5.0 hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while
paths that fall near the minimum recovery time have a lower P(s). In opposite, paths that
range from 6.0 hours to 506.5 hours have a higher likelihood of failure than success. Similar
to the success ranges, path recovery times that fall near 6.0 hours have a less likely chance
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to fail, but as the maximum recovery time of 506.5 hours is approached, the likelihood of
failure increases.
After conducting the modeled recovery of 10,000 multicell battery scenarios, all 10,000
generated critical path recovery times fell between 1.10 and 506.5 hours. Table 4.12 com-
pares statistical values between the predicted and modeled recovery scenarios. Like the
previous recovery scenarios, modeled recovery values are based off of SPAR-H analysis
and are of stochastic nature, resulting in values that are expected to vary considerably from
predicted values.
Table 4.12. Recovery Time Statistics for Multicell Battery Recovery
Recovery Scenario Min Max Mean SD Var
Predicted 25.57 50.83 38.20 17.87 319.2
Model 1.10 506.5 50.78 47.63 2270
The modeled recovery scenario produced four possible network paths with 10,000 recovery
times for each path. Figure 4.28 shows these outputs with common trends. In Figure 4.28
there are no significant high or low peaks or ranges of recovery times for certain recovery
paths. With no paths showing significantly higher recovery times than others, all recovery
paths have the potential to be considered critical recovery paths.
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Figure 4.28. Duration Required to Recover a Multicell Battery for 10,000
Modeled Scenarios
Critical paths drive the successful completion of the recovery network or process. When
assessing all 10,000 multicell battery recovery scenarios, Path #3 was determined to be the
most common critical path. Figure 4.29 identifies the Multicell Battery Recovery Network
critical path, Path #3, and the path’s associated recovery time. Based off of themost common,
longest recovery time, Path #3 is the critical path for the multicell battery recovery model.
It is important to note that the critical path is not necessarily the critical path for all of the
generator recovery scenarios; however, it does dominate over the other potential paths.
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Figure 4.29. Multicell Battery Recovery Network Diagram Showing the Crit-
ical Recovery Path #3 with an Estimated Recovery Time of 7 Hours.
With the critical path identified, the recovery time for that path was compared amongst
all 10,000 recovery scenarios. Figure 4.30 is a PDF summarizing the relationship between
all 10,000 recovery times and how often they occurred. This plot allows for assessment of
whether Path #3 has a higher likelihood of success or failure in respect to recovery time.
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Figure 4.30. PDF of Multicell Battery Recovery Path #3. The Most Frequent
Scenario Frequency Grouping is 208 of 10,000 Scenarios. The Mode Recovery
Time Range is 5.0 to 6.0 Hours with a 0.02 Probability of Occurrence.
For the multicell battery critical recovery path, Path #3, recovery times that fall under 5.0
hours have a have a higher likelihood of success than failure. Paths with recovery times
closer to 5.0 hours have the highest P(s) of recovery while paths that fall near the minimum
recovery time have a lower P(s). In opposite, paths that range from 6.0 hours or longer have
a higher likelihood of failure than success. Similar to the success ranges, path recovery
times that fall near 6.0 hours have a less likely chance to fail, but as recovery time increases
so does the likelihood of failure.
4.2 Multi-Scale Microgrid Component Recovery
This section will build off of individual component data results from the previous section. In
addition to observing SPAR-H and stochastic simulations for individual components, obser-
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vations will be made for combined component failure events. This section will provide two
multi-component failure event assessments that will evaluate how human error influences
the successful restoration of the entire microgrid architecture. A BOE assessment will be
completed for each failure event to determine the total microgrid recovery duration time as
well as provide data to assess whether human factors influenced that duration time.
Like the previous section, this section assesses a notional NAVSTA’s ability to rebound a
degraded microgrid system with a hypothetically combined component failure event. The
NAVSTA microgrid has a simple architecture that performs at normal operations under
ideal conditions. The indecent of failure is unintentional and isolated to a single microgrid
component. The NAVSTA microgrid has a simple architecture that performs at normal
operations under ideal conditions. The recovery plan for the two multi-component failure
events will include the same fully qualified two-person team consisting of a High Voltage
Supervisor and a LeadElectrician. The two-person teamwill be recovering every component
that fails with no breaks, rest periods, or days off. Environmental conditions will be ideal
and all tools and supplies are available and in supply.
Table 4.13 summarizes the installed and fully operating component capability for the
NAVSTA simple microgrid architecture.
Table 4.13. Total Number of NAVSTA Microgrid Components
Microgrid Component # of Components
Power Pole 2000






4.2.1 Multi-Component Failure Event #1
For this multi-component failure event, Table 4.14 summarizes the total number of compo-
nents that have been damaged or degraded. All components listed need to be fully repaired
in order to restore the NAVSTA microgrid back to normal operations.
Table 4.14. Number of Degraded Microgrid Components Applied for Failure
Event #1 BOE Analysis
Microgrid Component # Degraded Components
Power Pole 50





The simulated BOE analysis conducted on the multi-component failure event considers each
component’s modeled scenario’s critical path recovery times. The same simulated BOE
analysis was conducted with maximum and minimum predicted duration values provided
from [32]. Total duration times represent man-hours needed to recover all components in the
given failure event. In all three BOE analyses, resulting total durations exceeded USMC’s
and USN’s maximum autonomy times for energy security. By not meeting standardized
autonomy metrics, the NAVSTA of interest is unable to support mission critical areas and
is vulnerable in its ability to maintain energy security. All BOE final recovery durations
results are found in Table 4.15.
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Table 4.15. Failure Event #1 BOE Total Recovery Man-Hours Results for a
Two-Person Recovery Team
Recovery Scenario Man-Hours (hrs) Man-Hours
(days)
Modeled 1,588 66
Predicted Max 1,667 70
Predicted Min 1,084 46
4.2.2 Multi-Component Failure Event #2
For this multi-component failure event, Table 4.16 summarizes the total number of compo-
nents that have been damaged or degraded. All components listed need to be fully repaired
in order to restore the NAVSTA microgrid back to normal operations.
Table 4.16. Number of Degraded Microgrid Components Applied for Failure
Event #2 BOE Analysis
Microgrid Component # Degraded Components
Power Pole 500





Like failure event #1, The simulated BOE analysis conducted on the multi-component
failure event considers each component’s modeled scenario’s critical path recovery times.
The same simulated BOE analysis was conducted with maximum and minimum predicted
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duration values provided from [32]. Total duration times represent man-hours needed to
recover all components in the given failure event. In all three BOE analyses, resulting total
durations exceeded USMC’s and USN’s maximum autonomy times for energy security. By
not meeting standardized autonomy metrics, the NAVSTA of interest is unable to support
mission critical areas and is vulnerable in its ability to maintain energy security. All BOE
final recovery durations results are found in Table 4.17.
Table 4.17. Failure Event #2 BOE Total Recovery Man-Hours Results for a
Two-Person Recovery Team
Recovery Scenario Man-Hours (hrs) Man-Hours (days)
Modeled 10,900 454
Predicted Max 11,350 473
Predicted Min 7,761 324
4.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter applied the HPIRA tool that was developed in Chapter 3 to six different
microgrid component recovery processes and two multi-scale microgrid recovery events.
Successful recovery time durations are considered equal to the man-hours required for a
successful recovery of a degraded microgrid system. Additionally this chapter determined
recovery time bounds for each recovery process where microgrid restoration efforts were
likely to succeed and to fail. Chapter 5 summarizes Chapter 4’s findings, presents recom-




Energy security for DoD installations has never been a more important topic of study.
The DoD recognizes that modern energy infrastructures and systems have limitations in
regards to ensuring reliability, resilience, and efficiency [1]. Current safeguards designed
within energy systems alone do not place the DoD in secure conditions to maintain mission
readiness. It is incumbent upon all DoD installations to investigate new and diverse avenues
to support DoD initiatives in improving energy security. The USN firmly supports these
initiatives and strives to build on the three pillars of energy security within its own energy
infrastructures and systems. The goal of this thesis is to investigate and develop a method
to improve resilience within DoD microgrids. While most microgrid resilience research
focuses on system design, this thesis places focus on the operators of the microgrid sys-
tem. Specifically for microgrid recovery scenarios, this thesis draws attention to recovery
personnel’s cognitive states during their restoration efforts in recovery degraded microgrid
systems. This chapter shares closing thoughts about how human factors affect recovery
procedures. By considering these factors, DoD leadership can better prepare and manage its
workforce and resources to improve and strengthen energy security measures. This chapter
provides a summary of findings, presents recommendations, and suggests future work for
building DoD microgrid resilience with respect to microgrid recovery procedures.
5.1 Summary of Findings
In an effort to improve DoD microgrid resilience, this thesis investigates the influence
of human cognition in microgrid recovery procedures. While it is assumed that recovery
procedures improve the rebound of a degraded microgrid system, it does not guarantee
it. In fact, there is always a chance that recovery procedures can be further degraded
if the procedures are not properly performed. Within this thesis, six different microgrid
component recovery procedures are assessed as predicted recovery scenarios and asmodeled
recovery scenarios with SPAR-H applications. Both scenarios’ recovery time results are
shown in Table 5.1. For all components assessed, their respective critical path’s most
successful recovery time ranges fell under their average predicted recovery time values.
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This indicates that when considering human factors within recovery procedures, it does
not negatively impact the successful completion of component recoveries. While this data
reflects promising results, the scenarios are based on ideal situations where the recovery
teammembers are fully qualified, rested, and bear no other daily responsibilities or stressors.
Additionally, environmental conditions are ideal and introduce no further challenges or
complications in the recovery process.
Table 5.1. Most Successful Modeled Recovery Time Range and Average
Predicted Recovery Times for all Assessed Microgrid Components
Component Modeled (hr) Average Predicted (hr)
Pole 13.0 - 14.0 16.54
Generator 6.0 - 7.0 13.48
Substation 11.0 - 12.0 18.49
PV 3.0 - 4.0 6.16
Rechargeable Battery 4.0 - 5.0 7.08
Multicell Battery 5.0 - 6.0 38.20
Any paths that are completed in shorter durations than themost successful modeled recovery
durations have strong chances of successful system recovery. It is important to note that
even while the shortest duration time proves the success of a microgrid component and
system restoration, it may not necessarily occur, because rushing to complete tasks does not
guarantee successful recovery and could potentially cause inadvertent errors or mistakes.
That is why a higher likelihood of success will typically occur near the most successful
recovery time range. Also, each recovery path is dependent on the combination of task
complexity and longevity. The successful completion of the recovery path and/or process
is only as good as the persons completing it. There are pros and cons to evaluating a
single two-person restoration team in modeled recovery scenarios. By utilizing the same
recovery team members, familiarity and knowledge of component specifications allow for
more efficient reparations. However, the more damaged a component is, the more time
consuming the recovery tasks are. Familiarity and knowledge of a subject can only take
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a human so far if they are not mentally or physically fit. Fatigue and stress contribute to
prolonged completion of tasks and can very well result in further damage of a component.
Regardless of which component is being recovered, recovery duration times that take longer
than the most successful recovery time ranges will have an increased probability of failure
that can increase the risk of further system degradation or personnel injury. This will most
likely cause recovery personnel with experience greater fatigue as time goes on, which can
potentially increase the complexity of completing the recovery path.
This project comparedmodeledmulti-component recovery eventswith human factors.When
comparing modeled versus predicted man-hour outputs for recovering two different events,
it was determined that human factors did not significantly differ from predicted man-hour
estimations. These results are not rigorous enough to be used as proven data for the given
events in Tables 4.15 and 4.17.While these two events used SPAR-H implemented stochastic
values, the data resulting from various failed component combinations is not truly realistic.
Each event assumes continuous repair operations with a single two-person repair team.
In these assessments, huge factors such as working hours, non-working hours, weekends,
rest time, and repair location travel time are not considered. Given these limitations, the
total man-hours determined in both assessments still failed USN and USMC standards
for installation energy autonomy. Therefore, if the important factors as mentioned are
considered, it is expected that the recovery duration will be even longer if the recovery
effort is left to a single two-person recovery team.
To improve the total recovery time, or better manage man-hours, a considerable amount
of additional, fully qualified recovery teams need to be utilized to meet USN and USMC
standards. It is essential that not only are the recovery teams fully qualified, but also
that they have the same adequate experience to perform all skill sets so that they can be
interchanged between teams if needed. By adding recovery teams to these events, recovery
efforts can potentially be sped up. For both failure events, Table 5.2 compares the single
two-person recovery team and associated man-hour totals as well as estimated recovery
team numbers that are needed to meet USN autonomy standards. Event required team totals
are a conservative estimates considering predicted maximum man-hour totals. Those teams
will work continuously with rotating 12-hour shifts.
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Table 5.2. Number of Recovery Teams and Personnel for Modeled Events
and Required Autonomy Standards







In conclusion, established recovery procedures generally do improve the rebound of a
degraded microgrid when considering the influence of human cognition. This conclusion
is not consistent through every recovery procedure since human cognition is affected by
various factors as pointed out in the SPAR-H analysis. What is consistent in the analysis is
that as an event’s recovery time extends, themore likely amicrogrid system recovery process
will fail. Additionally, as observed in Section 4.2, the more complicated a recovery event
is, the more man-hours will be needed to successfully recover all microgrid components. In
order to meet USN autonomy standards, DoD installations must consider increasing their
energy facility workforce with enough qualified and experienced personnel to adequately
respond to wide-scale microgrid failure events.
5.2 Recommendations
Determining recovery man-hours for various unexpected microgrid disturbances, with hu-
man factors consideration, allows for stakeholders to assess safety risks. Safety within the
DoD is a major factor for all personnel, equipment, and installation operations. When stake-
holders identifyman-hours that are expected for a specific recovery effort, adequate planning
to support that effort should be taken. Within this planning effort, stakeholders can identify
the amount of recovery personnel needed so that teams are not overly worked. Fatigued
recovery team members are subject to unintentional mistakes that can cause injury or harm
to themselves or others and/or cause further equipment damage. Additionally, the potentially
extraordinary volume of effort required in recovery scenarios can cause additional stress on
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recovery team personnel, resulting in similar outcomes of fatigued personnel. Recognizing
the amount of man-hours needed in recovery efforts will also highlight any weaknesses of
an installation’s manpower and training. It is imperative that DoD leadership is aware of
man-hour needs of potential microgrid recovery efforts so that recovery personnel are kept
safe. Ensuring safety of the DoD’s most important asset, its people, will build and support
resilience in the DoD’s energy security initiative.
Results from this thesis can be used as strong data sources for DoD installation stakeholders
for personnel manning and budget discussions. Simulating various component failures and
multi-component failure events allows for stakeholders to determine adequate man-hours
needed to ensure that DoD installations support energy security initiatives. By determin-
ing man-hour requirements for installation demands, deficiencies in manning, training, and
system supply can also be identified. It is recommended that DoD installation command-
ing officers and facility managers communicate their data findings early and often to their
reporting chain of commands and respective program offices to ensure that their needs are
included in their annual Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and Budget Estimate
Submissions (BESs). This consistent data-based communication will highlight energy se-
curity vulnerabilities to DoD leadership so that yearly budgets can account for costs to hire
more qualified personnel, to provide adequate training resources, and to provide purchasing
budgets for spare parts and equipment. This effort will build and support the DoD’s energy
security initiative with improved resilience.
While recovery procedures provide a consistent and available approach strategy for micro-
grid recoveries, they must also be used with optimistic caution. Like any type of instruction
or reference, procedures and guidance need to stay updated and relevant with system devel-
opments and specifications. This is a challenge with constantly changing technologies that
replace broken or outdated equipment or components. If recovery guidance or references
are not kept up to date, application of the procedures will not reflect the proper actions
needed to restore a degraded component or system. Additionally, the recovery personnel
applying those procedures need to be knowledgeable of the new procedures by receiving
enough training to effectively perform them. If these forethoughts are not considered, the
recovery process can be dragged out for long durations or even cause further damage to
a system. Similar to preforming recovery tasks, the recovery process is only as good as
the constant maintaining of the procedures themselves, the adequate training of those new
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procedures, and the proper planning and coordination of newly installed system and com-
ponent integration efforts. Without these considerations, DoD installation microgrids are
vulnerable in having their once proven recovery procedures fail and backfire, causing cas-
cading challenges and issues. It is recommended that DoD installation commanding officers
and facility managers maintain microgrid recovery procedures at least quarterly to identify
issues early so that energy security risks can be mitigated early.
5.3 Future Work
This thesis leverages a simple microgrid architecture from [8] to develop the HPIRA tool
for various component recovery process simulations. The HPIRA tool generates recovery
duration times for successful recovery processes, however, the recovery durations best
represent the man-hours needed to recover downed components. In order to better and more
accurately determine man-hours needed for failure events, further investigation should be
taken into different human cognitive states. This thesis provides the foundation of analysing
the effect of human cognition on successfully completed recovery tasks and processes,
however, the SPAR-H PSF ratings are based off of ideal conditions. More rigorous cognitive
scenarios can provide a more realistic and conservative recovery assessment for DoD
microgrids. Additionally, research should consider how PSFs change as failure events are
prolonged or emerge into cascading failure events. This research applies the initial state of
PSF ratings for all failure scenarios, but in reality, factors such as stress and fitness for duty
become more relevant as they change over time.
While this thesis focuses on unintentional microgrid failure scenarios, research should be
done on microgrid failures that result from commission, or intentional malicious attacks.
Consideration and focus on high value assets on DoD installations should be assessed so that
in the case of events like targeted terrorist attacks, DoD installations have system protections
and responses in place. This research may lead towards classified distributions, but it will
allow stakeholders to have greater knowledge and awareness of microgrid recovery efforts
on critical microgrid supported infrastructures. Additionally, this research can lead towards
assessing cyber attack recovery processes that influence electric systems such as microgrids.
This effort will most likely require coordination and assistance from information technology
and software development personnel to best capture electronic recovery procedures.
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The HPIRA tool’s framework provides a valid data source for personnel manning, support,
and training that can be used for other types of analysis. With generated recovery time
durations, or man-hour requirements, HPIRA data can be used within cost analysis research.
Man-hours for various microgrid recovery scenarios that do not include normal operations
and maintenance actions, can influence budget factors that cover personnel overtime and
training as well as salary costs for government and contracted personnel. Additionally,
HPIRAdata can be used for system suitability research in considering reliability, availability,
and maintainability of microgrid systems and components. These considerations can and
should be included in life cycle cost estimations for DoD microgrid systems.
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Table A.1 summarizes the Downed Pole Recovery Task Descriptions.
Table A.1. Downed Pole Recovery Task Descriptions
Node Recovery Task
A 2-man crew identified & depart
B Crew investigates scene
C Crew Member A walks the line
D Crew Member B voltage checks
E Crew reports fault(s)/repair actions
F Connect temporary Gen to Connection Pt w/Tie In
G Secure Physical Area of Incident
H Electrically isolate @ Breakers w/tag outs
I Safety Checks
J Stabilize Damaged Pole with Utility Truck Pinchers
K Pull & Replace Damaged Fuses
L Repair 3 Line Pole with Cross Arms
M Clean Oil Spill from Transformer Damage
N Transport New Transformer to Site w/Crane
O Secure & Restore Connections to new transformer
P Re-energize power lines @ breakers
Q Verify power outputs at substation controllers, no faults
R Disconnect temporary Generator
S Recovery
Table A.2 summarizes the precedence order for the Downed Pole Task List.
95
Table A.2. Downed Pole Recovery Precedence List
























Table A.3 shows all possible paths and their duration within the network. Note that the
duration values for each path are a summation of stochastic results for each task or node.
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Table A.3. Downed Pole Recovery Network Paths and Duration for 5 Itera-
tions
Paths 1 2 3 4 5
ABDEFHIJKLMNOPRS 25.645 15.641 28.673 19.222 6.6002
ABCEFHIJKLMNOPRS 25.667 15.401 28.51 19.267 6.762
ABDEFGJKLMNOPRS 24.437 14.42 28.823 19.866 7.8396
ABCEFGJKLMNOPRS 24.46 14.18 28.66 19.911 8.0014
ABDEFHIJLMNOPRS 25.322 14.843 28.399 18.728 6.0917
ABCEFHIJLMNOPRS 25.345 14.603 28.236 18.772 6.2535
ABDEFGJLMNOPRS 24.115 13.621 28.549 19.371 7.3311
ABCEFGJLMNOPRS 24.137 13.382 28.386 19.416 7.4929
ABDEFHIJKLNOPRS 23.09 14.997 25.109 12.03 5.8433
ABCEFHIJKLNOPRS 23.112 14.757 24.946 12.075 6.005
ABDEFGJKLNOPRS 21.882 13.775 25.259 12.673 7.0826
ABCEFGJKLNOPRS 21.905 13.536 25.096 12.718 7.2444
ABDEFHIJLNOPRS 22.767 14.199 24.835 11.535 5.3347
ABCEFHIJLNOPRS 22.79 13.959 24.672 11.58 5.4965
ABDEFGJLNOPRS 21.56 12.977 24.985 12.179 6.5741
ABCEFGJLNOPRS 21.582 12.737 24.822 12.223 6.7359
ABDEFHIJKLMNOQRS 25.623 15.682 28.214 19.171 6.7659
ABCEFHIJKLMNOQRS 25.646 15.442 28.052 19.216 6.9277
ABDEFGJKLMNOQRS 24.416 14.46 28.364 19.815 8.0053
ABCEFGJKLMNOQRS 24.438 14.221 28.202 19.86 8.1671
ABDEFHIJLMNOQRS 25.301 14.884 27.94 18.676 6.2574
ABCEFHIJLMNOQRS 24.093 13.662 28.09 19.32 7.4968
ABDEFGJLMNOQRS 25.301 14.884 27.94 18.676 6.2574
ABCEFGJLMNOQRS 24.116 13.422 27.928 19.365 7.6585
ABDEFHIJKLNOQRS 23.068 15.038 24.651 11.978 6.0089
ABCEFHIJKLNOQRS 23.091 14.798 24.488 12.023 6.1707
ABDEFGJKLNOQRS 21.861 13.816 24.801 12.622 7.2483
ABCEFGJKLNOQRS 21.883 13.576 24.638 12.667 7.4101
ABDEFHIJLNOQRS 22.746 14.24 24.377 11.483 5.5004
ABCEFHIJLNOQRS 22.768 14.00 24.214 11.528 5.6622
ABDEFGJLNOQRS 21.538 13.018 24.527 12.127 6.7398
ABCEFGJLNOQRS 21.561 12.778 24.364 12.172 6.9016
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Table B.1 summarizes the Generator Recovery Task Descriptions.
Table B.1. Generator Recovery Task Descriptions
Node Recovery Task
A 2-man crew identified & depart
B Crew investigates scene
C Crew investigates status of generator (running or not)
D GEN Running: Check ATS status & protection breaker status
E Check status of main breakers (not tripped) & connection points
(on buildings)
F If #5 SAT, investigate circuits - fault found: short circuit
G Measure amperage draw: Circuit Overload (>20amp)?
H Crew reports fault(s)/repair actions
I Secure Physical Area of Incident
J Electrically isolate @ Breakers w/tag outs
K Safety Checks
L Split Circuit (split load & modify plugs)
M Secure and restore connections
N Reengergize @breakers
O Measure load (verify load below rating capacity)
P Verify power outputs at substation controllers, no faults
Q Recovery
Table B.2 summarizes the precedence order for the Generator Loss Task List.
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Table B.2. Generator Recovery Precedence List




















Table B.3 shows all possible paths and their duration within the network. Note that the
duration values for each path are a summation of stochastic results for each task or node.
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Table B.3. Generator Recovery Network Paths and Duration for 5 Iterations
Paths 1 2 3 4 5
ABCEFGIJKLMPQ 8.4379 20.515 28.085 15.479 24.156
ABCDFGIJKLMPQ 6.4322 20.189 28.025 14.39 23.941
ABCEFGHJKLMPQ 8.7386 20.686 27.647 15.68 24.562
ABCDFGHJKLMPQ 6.7329 20.36 27.587 14.591 24.347
ABCEFGIJKLNOQ 8.2951 21.51 27.814 13.646 23.476
ABCDFGIJKLNOQ 6.2894 21.192 27.754 12.556 23.261
ABCEFGHJKLNOQ 8.5958 21.689 27.376 13.847 23.881
ABCDFGHJKLNOQ 6.5901 21.363 27.316 12.758 23.666
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Table C.1 summarizes the Substation Recovery Task Descriptions.
Table C.1. Substation Recovery Task Descriptions
Node Recovery Task
A 2-man crew identified & depart
B Investigate Substation Status w/remote SCATA-find open breakers
C Crew investigates scene
D Investigate 1247 transformer circuit panel forOpen Feeder Breaker
E Investigate 1247 transformer circuit panel for Open Main Feeder
Breaker
F Investigate 345 transformer circuit panel - outside fault out in the
field (due to insulator split on pole)
G Crew reports fault(s)/repair actions
H Secure Physical Area of Incident
I Electrically isolate @ Breakers w/tag outs
J Safety Checks
K Deploy and use bucket truck to investigate insulator crack
L Replace insulation materials and verify connections all secure
M Inspect transformer for wet/dry sump blown fuses, or windings
N Remove and replace blown wet sump fuse
O PerformFrequency&MEGGERTests (static voltage onwindings)
on each transformer phase to ensure no other damage
P Secure and restore connections
Q Re-energize @breakers
R Verify power outputs at substation controllers, no faults
S Recovery
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Table C.2 summarizes the precedence order for the Substation Loss Task List.
Table C.2. Substation Recovery Precedence List






















Table C.3 shows all possible paths and their duration within the network. Note that the
duration values for each path are a summation of stochastic results for each task or node.
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Table C.3. Substation Recovery Network Paths and Duration for 5 Iterations
Paths 1 2 3 4 5
ABCDEGIJKLMOPQRS 12.61 25.038 19.718 93.579 18.592
ABCFGIJKLMOPQRS 10.084 24.107 19.398 93.339 18.267
ABCDEGHJKLMOPQRS 12.996 25.211 19.557 93.589 18.441
ABCFGHJKLMOPQRS 10.47 24.28 19.237 93.349 18.116
ABCDEGIJNOPQRS 9.7187 9.0098 4.6135 16.645 6.5564
ABCFGIJNOPQRS 7.1927 8.0786 4.2935 16.405 6.2314
ABCDEGHJNOPQRS 10.105 9.1826 4.4525 16.654 6.4054
ABCFGHJNOPQRS 7.5791 8.2514 4.1325 16.414 6.0805
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Table D.1 summarizes the PV Recovery Task Descriptions.
Table D.1. PV Recovery Task Descriptions
Node Recovery Task
A 2-man crew identified & depart
B Crew investigates scene
C Crew examines single inverter for a simple reset
D Perform voltage checks to identify degraded PV panel
E Crew reports fault(s)/repair actions
F Secure Physical Area of Incident
G Open identified PV panel - Identify fault - ground
H Electrically isolate @ Breakers & Combiner Box w/tag out
I Safety Checks
J Modify Wiring: Disconnect wiring, bypass failed panel to next
panel, Reconnect Wiring
K Secure and restore connections
L Re-energize @breakers
M Verify voltage/amperage with voltage checks
N Recovery
Table D.2 summarizes the precedence order for the PV Loss Task List.
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Table D.2. PV Recovery Precedence List
















Table D.3. PV Recovery Network Paths and Duration for 5 Iterations
Paths 1 2 3 4 5
ABCEFGIKLMN 4.6936 3.535 3.2827 3.1377 2.5475
ABCDGIKLMN 4.0722 10.038 10.27 1.7316 3.1813
ABCEFGHJKLMN 6.3943 3.8543 3.9293 3.2103 3.1925
ABCDGHJKLMN 5.7729 10.358 10.917 1.8042 3.8263
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APPENDIX E:
Rechargeable Battery Loss Data
Table E.1 summarizes the Rechargeable Battery Recovery Task Descriptions.
Table E.1. Rechargeable Battery Recovery Task Descriptions
Node Recovery Task
A 2-man crew identified & depart
B Crew investigates scene
C Crew examines alarm panels to indicate equipment with failed
batteries
D Crew reports fault(s)/repair actions
E Secure Physical Area of Incident
F Safety Checks
G Open breakers to lighten load on COGEN
H Electrically isolate battery
I Remove module & clean connectors & replace module
J Charge battery module
K Secure and restore connections
L Re-energize @breakers & restart substation battery
M Verify equipment indications are SAT @substation
N Recovery
Table E.2 summarizes the precedence order for the Rechargeable Battery Task List.
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Table E.2. Rechargeable Battery Precedence List

















Table E.3 shows all possible paths and their duration within the network. Note that the
duration values for each path are a summation of stochastic results for each task or node.
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Table E.3. Rechargeable Battery Recovery Network Paths and Duration for
5 Iterations
Paths 1 2 3 4 5
ACDFGHIJLMN 3.9254 10.604 13.848 3.2448 7.7349
ABDFGHIJLMN 4.5573 10.652 14.064 3.2567 7.5405
ACDEGHIJLMN 3.6225 10.403 13.208 2.7794 6.8727
ABDEGHIJLMN 4.2544 10.451 13.424 2.7912 6.6783
ACDFGHIJKMN 3.7262 10.085 13.525 3.2843 7.1654
ABDFGHIJKMN 4.3581 10.133 13.741 3.2962 6.971
ACDEGHIJKMN 3.4233 9.884 12.885 2.8189 6.3032
ABDEGHIJKMN 4.0552 9.9316 13.101 2.8308 6.1088
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APPENDIX F:
MultiCell Battery Loss Data
Table F.1 summarizes the Multicell Battery Recovery Task Descriptions.
Table F.1. Multicell Battery Recovery Task Descriptions
Node Recovery Task
A 2-man crew identified & depart
B Crew investigates scene
C Crew reports fault(s)/repair actions
D Secure Physical Area of Incident
E Electrically isolate battery rack
F Disconnect leads & remove battery rack
G Replace with new battery rack, connect leads
H Safety checks
I Restart storage system
J Charge battery rack
K Reengergize @breakers & restart battery rack
L Verify power output by each rack controller: voltage and amperage
readings check at each disconnect and breaker
M Recovery
Table F.2 summarizes the precedence order for the Multicell Battery Loss Task List.
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Table F.2. Multicell Battery Recovery Precedence List















Table F.3 shows all possible paths and their duration within the network. Note that the
duration values for each path are a summation of stochastic results for each task or node.
Table F.3. Multicell Battery Recovery Network Paths and Duration for 5
Iterations
Paths 1 2 3 4 5
ABCEFGIJKLM 55.141 24.593 24.327 102.89 8.6922
ABCDFGIJKLM 54.868 25.212 24.502 102.85 9.219
ABCEFGHJKLM 55.14 24.632 24.422 102.64 8.5736
ABCDFGHJKLM 54.866 25.251 24.597 102.6 9.1005
114
APPENDIX G:
PIRA Matlab Model & Supporting Functions
Matlab Code for the HPIRA Test Model for an Example
Failed Component
1
2 % Manual Update f o r L ine s : 37 ,38 ,55 ,80
3
4 %% Impor t SPAR−H PSF Data
5 [ ~ , shee t_name ]= x l s f i n f o ( ’SPAR−H PSF Inpu t s_Example . x l s x ’ ) ;
6 f o r k =1: numel ( shee t_name ) ;
7 [ ~ , ~ , d a t a {k }]= x l s r e a d ( ’SPAR−H PSF Inpu t s_Example . x l s x ’ ,
shee t_name {k } ) ;
8 end
9
10 a = 1 ;
11 % Diagno s i s / Ac t i on PSF Data I n p u t s
12 f o r k = 1 : 2 : numel ( shee t_name ) ;
13 Diagno s i s { a } = d a t a {k } ( 2 : numel ( shee t_name ) , 5 ) ;
14 PSF_Diagnos i s { a } = c e l l f u n ( @rmmissing , D i a gno s i s { a } ,
’ Uni formOutput ’ , f a l s e ) ;
15 PSF_Diagnos i s { a } = PSF_Diagnos i s { a }(~ c e l l f u n ( ’
i s emp ty ’ , PSF_Diagnos i s { a } ) ) ;
16 % Calc t h e Diagnosis_HEP ( P a r t B & C & D)
17 Neg a t i v e _Mu l t i p l e s _D i a g n o s i s { a } = c e l l 2ma t (
PSF_Diagnos i s { a } ) >= 1 ;
18 Diagnosis_HEP {a} = 1E−2∗ prod ( c e l l 2ma t ( PSF_Diagnos i s {
a } ) ) ;
19 i f sum ( Neg a t i v e _Mu l t i p l e s _D i a g n o s i s { a } ) >= 3 ; %
g r e a t e r t h an o r j u s t 3 o f 8 PSFs a r e Nega t i v e
PSFs ( >1 va l u e )
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20 Diagnosis_HEP {a} = ( Diagnosis_HEP {a } ) / ( 1 E−2∗(
p rod ( c e l l 2ma t ( PSF_Diagnos i s { a } ) ) −1) +1) ;
21 end
22 Act ion { a} = d a t a {k +1} (2 : numel ( shee t_name ) , 5 ) ; %
Even #d She e t s : Ac t i on PSF Tabs
23 PSF_Action { a} = c e l l f u n ( @rmmissing , Ac t i on { a } , ’
Uni formOutput ’ , f a l s e ) ;
24 PSF_Action { a} = PSF_Action { a }(~ c e l l f u n ( ’ i s emp ty ’ ,
PSF_Action { a } ) ) ;
25 % Calc t h e Action_HEP ( P a r t B & C & D)
26 Nega t i v e _Mu l t i p l e s _Ac t i o n { a} = c e l l 2ma t ( PSF_Action { a
} ) >= 1 ;
27 Action_HEP{a} = 1E−3∗ prod ( c e l l 2ma t ( PSF_Action { a } ) ) ;
28 i f sum ( Neg a t i v e _Mu l t i p l e s _Ac t i o n { a } ) >= 3 ; %
g r e a t e r t h an o r j u s t 3 o f 8 PSFs a r e Nega t i v e
PSFs ( >1 va l u e )
29 Action_HEP{a} = ( Action_HEP{a } ) / ( 1 E−3∗( p rod (
c e l l 2ma t ( PSF_Action { a } ) ) −1) +1) ;
30 end
31 P_WOD{a} = Diagnosis_HEP {a} + Action_HEP{a } ;
32 a = a + 1 ;
33 end
34 %% Impor t RA Se t Node ( Task ) P r e cedence
35 op t s = s p r e a d s h e e t Impo r tOp t i o n s ( " NumVariables " , 3 ) ;
36 op t s . Shee t = " RA_Set_Example " ; %
Update
37 op t s . DataRange = " I4 : K10 " ; %
Update
38 op t s . Var iab leNames = [ " VarName5 " , "VarName6 " , "VarName7 " ] ;
39 op t s . Va r i a b l eType s = [ " cha r " , " c h a r " , " c h a r " ] ;
40 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " VarName5 " , "VarName6 " , "VarName7
" ] , " Whi t e spaceRu le " , " p r e s e r v e " ) ;
41 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " VarName5 " , "VarName6 " , "VarName7
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" ] , " EmptyF ie ldRule " , " au t o " ) ;
42 Recove r yAc t i onSe t s = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( " Mic r og r i d
Recovery Pa t h s Te s t / I n p u t Data / Recovery Ac t i on S e t s . x l s x
" , op t s , " UseExcel " , f a l s e ) ) ;
43
44 op t s = s p r e a d s h e e t Impo r tOp t i o n s ( " NumVariables " , 4 ) ;
45 op t s . Shee t = " RA_Set_Example " ; %
Update ( Shee t Name )
46 op t s . DataRange = "C3 : F7 " ;
% Update ( Task L i s t
Range )
47 op t s . Var iab leNames = [ " I n s e r tA sGe n e r a l " , "VarName2 " , "
I n s e r tA sGen e r a l 1 " , "VarName4 " ] ;
48 op t s . Va r i a b l eType s = [ " cha r " , " c h a r " , " c h a r " , " c h a r " ] ;
49 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " I n s e r tA sGe n e r a l " , "VarName2 " , "
I n s e r tA sGen e r a l 1 " , "VarName4 " ] , " Whi t e spaceRu le " , "
p r e s e r v e " ) ;
50 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " I n s e r tA sGe n e r a l " , "VarName2 " , "
I n s e r tA sGen e r a l 1 " , "VarName4 " ] , " EmptyF ie ldRule " , " au t o " )
;
51 Task_Dura t ion_Times = s t r 2 d o u b l e ( t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( "
I n p u t Data / Recovery Ac t ion S e t s . x l s x " , op t s , " UseExcel " ,
f a l s e ) ) ) ;
52
53 %% RA C r i t i c a l Pa th & Du r a t i o n
54
55 % Conver t Ma t r i x t o column v e c t o r s & Adjacency Mat r i x &
Diagraph & Network Diagram
56 s = Recove ryAc t i onSe t s ( : , 1 ) ;
57 t = Recove r yAc t i onSe t s ( : , 2 ) ;
58 RA = d i g r a ph ( s , t ) ;
59 f i g u r e ( 1 )
60 Network_Diagram = p l o t (RA) ; % Network Diagram
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61 t i t l e ( " Recovery Network Diagram " ) ;
62 Task_Network = RA. Edges ; % Task Network A c t i v i t y &
Edge L i s t i n g s
63 i t e r a t i o n s = 10000 ; % Change based o f f
p r e f e r e n c e
64
65 % Find Human E r r o r P r ob ab l e (HEP) , o r P r o b a b i l i t y o f E r ro r ,
f o r i n d i v i d u a l t a s k s
66 [HEP] = findHEP ( PSF_Diagnos is , PSF_Action ) ;
67
68 % Find a l l P a t h s w i t h i n t h e Recovery Se t
69 [ C r i t i c a l _ P a t h s ] = f i n d C r i t i c a l P a t h s (HEP) ;
70 s t o r a g e _ p a t h s = C r i t i c a l _ P a t h s ;
71 C r i t i c a l _ P a t h s = s t r 2 d o u b l e ( C r i t i c a l _ P a t h s ) ;
72
73 % Pre−A l l o c a t e Memory f o r P a t h s & Du r a t i o n s
74 Du r a t i o n s = z e r o s ( l e n g t h ( C r i t i c a l _ P a t h s ) , i t e r a t i o n s ) ;
75 Du r a t i o n s ( : , 1 ) = ( C r i t i c a l _ P a t h s ) ;
76
77 % Dete rmine Pa th Du r a t i o n s f o r each # i t e r a t i o n s
78 f o r w = 1 : i t e r a t i o n s
79 [ Sample_Dura t ion ] = f i n dSamp l eDu r a t i o n ( C r i t i c a l _ P a t h s ,
HEP) ;
80 Sample_Dura t ion = t r a n s p o s e ( Sample_Dura t ion ) ;
81 Du r a t i o n s ( : ,w) = t r a n s p o s e ( Sample_Dura t ion ) ;
82 end
83
84 % Table o f A l l P a t h s & Du r a t i o n s
85 Pa t h s _Du r a t i o n s = t a b l e ( s t o r a g e _ p a t h s , Du r a t i o n s ) ;
86 Pa t h s _Du r a t i o n s . P r o p e r t i e s . Var iab leNames = { ’ Recovery Pa th ’
’ Du r a t i o n ( h r ) ’ } ;
87 Pa t h s _Du r a t i o n s = s p l i t v a r s ( P a t h s _Du r a t i o n s , ’ Du r a t i o n ( h r ) ’ )
;
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88 c s vw r i t e ( ’ Example . csv ’ , Du r a t i o n s ) % Update based on
I t e r a t i o n s
89
90 % Dete rmine Max Du r a t i o n o f each I t e r a t i o n −> C r i t i c a l Pa th
o f each Du r a t i o n
91 [ Max_Duration , Max_Index ] = max ( Du r a t i o n s ) ;
92 [ I_row , I _ c o l ] = ind2sub ( s i z e ( P a t h s _Du r a t i o n s ) , Max_Index ) ;
93
94 % Example : Looking a t j u s t t h e 1 s t i t e r a t i o n
95 p = 1 ;
96 CP = t r a n s p o s e ( c e l l 2ma t ( s t o r a g e _ p a t h s ( I_row ( p ) ) ) ) ;
97 CP_Dura t ion = Max_Durat ion ( p ) ;
98 f p r i n t f ( ’ C r i t i c a l Pa th & Du r a t i o n f o r 1 s t i t e r a t i o n : %s %g
h r s ’ ,CP , CP_Dura t ion )
99
100 %% Cle a r t empo ra ry v a r i a b l e s
101 % c l e a r o p t s
Matlab Code for HPIRA Test Supporting Functions
Function: findCriticalPaths
1
2 %% Find C r i t i c a l P a t h s
3
4 f u n c t i o n [ C r i t i c a l _ P a t h s ] = f i n d C r i t i c a l P a t h s (HEP)
5
6 op t s = s p r e a d s h e e t Impo r tOp t i o n s ( " NumVariables " , 3 ) ;
7 op t s . Shee t = " RA_Set_Example " ;
% Update ( Shee t Name )
8 op t s . DataRange = " I4 : K10 " ;
% Update (
P r e cedence L i s t Range )
9 op t s . Var iab leNames = [ " VarName5 " , "VarName6 " , "VarName7 " ] ;
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10 op t s . Va r i a b l eType s = [ " cha r " , " c h a r " , " c h a r " ] ;
11 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " VarName5 " , "VarName6 " , "VarName7
" ] , " Whi t e spaceRu le " , " p r e s e r v e " ) ;
12 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " VarName5 " , "VarName6 " , "VarName7
" ] , " EmptyF ie ldRule " , " au t o " ) ;
13 Recove r yAc t i onSe t s = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( " Mic r og r i d
Recovery Pa t h s Te s t / I n p u t Data / Recovery Ac t i on S e t s . x l s x
" , op t s , " UseExcel " , f a l s e ) ) ;
14
15 op t s = s p r e a d s h e e t Impo r tOp t i o n s ( " NumVariables " , 4 ) ;
16 op t s . Shee t = " RA_Set_Example " ;
% Update ( Shee t Name )
17 op t s . DataRange = "C3 : F7 " ;
% Update ( Task L i s t
Range )
18 op t s . Var iab leNames = [ " I n s e r tA sGe n e r a l " , "VarName2 " , "
I n s e r tA sGen e r a l 1 " , "VarName4 " ] ;
19 op t s . Va r i a b l eType s = [ " cha r " , " c h a r " , " c h a r " , " c h a r " ] ;
20 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " I n s e r tA sGe n e r a l " , "VarName2 " , "
I n s e r tA sGen e r a l 1 " , "VarName4 " ] , " Whi t e spaceRu le " , "
p r e s e r v e " ) ;
21 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " I n s e r tA sGe n e r a l " , "VarName2 " , "
I n s e r tA sGen e r a l 1 " , "VarName4 " ] , " EmptyF ie ldRule " , " au t o " )
;
22 Task_Dura t ion_Times = s t r 2 d o u b l e ( t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( "
Mic r og r i d Recovery Pa t h s Te s t / I n p u t Data / Recovery Ac t i on
S e t s . x l s x " , op t s , " UseExcel " , f a l s e ) ) ) ;
23
24 s = Recove ryAc t i onSe t s ( : , 1 ) ;
25 t = Recove r yAc t i onSe t s ( : , 2 ) ;
26 RA = d i g r a ph ( s , t ) ;
27
28 [ RA_paths , RA] = g e t p a t h s (RA) ; % Gene r a t e s A l l P o s s i b l e
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Pa t h s
29 a = 1 ;
30 f o r k = 1 : numel ( RA_paths )
31 [ Weights ] = f i n dWe igh t s ( Task_Dura t ion_Times , HEP) ;
32 f o r y = 1 : l e n g t h ( Task_Dura t ion_Times )
33 RA. Nodes . Weight {y} = Weights {y } ;
34 end
35 pa t h { : , k} = c e l l 2ma t (RA. Nodes . Name ( RA_paths {k } ) ) ;
% Al l P a t h s w/ Node P r e cedence as I n t e g e r s i n
columns
36 C r i t i c a l _ P a t h s = t r a n s p o s e ( p a t h ) ;
% Spe c i f y Nodes P r e cedence as
C h a r a c t e r s ( i n s e q u e n t i a l o rde r , no t i n o r d e r o f





2 %% Find HEP
3
4 f u n c t i o n [HEP] = findHEP ( PSF_Diagnos is , PSF_Action )
5
6 % Impor t SPAR−H PSF Data
7 [ ~ , shee t_name ]= x l s f i n f o ( ’SPAR−H PSF Inpu t s_Example . x l s x ’ ) ;
% Update
8 f o r k =1: numel ( shee t_name ) ;
9 [ ~ , ~ , d a t a {k }]= x l s r e a d ( ’SPAR−H PSF Inpu t s_Example . x l s x ’ ,
shee t_name {k } ) ; % Update
10 end
11
12 a = 1 ;
13 % Diagno s i s / Ac t i on PSF Data I n p u t s
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14 f o r k = 1 : 2 : numel ( shee t_name ) ;
15 Diagno s i s { a } = d a t a {k } ( 2 : numel ( shee t_name ) , 5 ) ;
16 PSF_Diagnos i s { a } = c e l l f u n ( @rmmissing , D i a gno s i s { a } ,
’ Uni formOutput ’ , f a l s e ) ;
17 PSF_Diagnos i s { a } = PSF_Diagnos i s { a }(~ c e l l f u n ( ’
i s emp ty ’ , PSF_Diagnos i s { a } ) ) ;
18 % Calc t h e Diagnosis_HEP ( P a r t B & C & D)
19 Neg a t i v e _Mu l t i p l e s _D i a g n o s i s { a } = c e l l 2ma t (
PSF_Diagnos i s { a } ) >= 1 ;
20 Diagnosis_HEP {a} = 1E−2∗ prod ( c e l l 2ma t ( PSF_Diagnos i s {
a } ) ) ;
21 i f sum ( Neg a t i v e _Mu l t i p l e s _D i a g n o s i s { a } ) >= 3 ; %
g r e a t e r t h an o r j u s t 3 o f 8 PSFs a r e Nega t i v e
PSFs ( >1 va l u e )
22 Diagnosis_HEP {a} = ( Diagnosis_HEP {a } ) / ( 1 E−2∗(
p rod ( c e l l 2ma t ( PSF_Diagnos i s { a } ) ) −1) +1) ;
23 end
24 Act ion { a} = d a t a {k +1} (2 : numel ( shee t_name ) , 5 ) ; %
Even #d She e t s : Ac t i on PSF Tabs
25 PSF_Action { a} = c e l l f u n ( @rmmissing , Ac t i on { a } , ’
Uni formOutput ’ , f a l s e ) ;
26 PSF_Action { a} = PSF_Action { a }(~ c e l l f u n ( ’ i s emp ty ’ ,
PSF_Action { a } ) ) ;
27 % Calc t h e Action_HEP ( P a r t B & C & D)
28 Nega t i v e _Mu l t i p l e s _Ac t i o n { a} = c e l l 2ma t ( PSF_Action { a
} ) >= 1 ;
29 Action_HEP{a} = 1E−3∗ prod ( c e l l 2ma t ( PSF_Action { a } ) ) ;
30 i f sum ( Neg a t i v e _Mu l t i p l e s _Ac t i o n { a } ) >= 3 ; %
g r e a t e r t h an o r j u s t 3 o f 8 PSFs a r e Nega t i v e
PSFs ( >1 va l u e )
31 Action_HEP{a} = ( Action_HEP{a } ) / ( 1 E−3∗( p rod (
c e l l 2ma t ( PSF_Action { a } ) ) −1) +1) ;
32 end
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33 P_WOD{a} = Diagnosis_HEP {a} + Action_HEP{a } ;
34 a = a + 1 ;
35 end
36
37 %% Calc P_WD ( wi th dependence )
38
39 a = 1 ;
40 f o r k = 2 : 2 : numel ( shee t_name ) ;
41 Dependency {a} = d a t a {k } ( 4 , 1 0 ) ;
42 x = Dependency {a } ;
43 i f s t r cmp i ( x , ’ Complete ’ )
44 P_WD{a} = 1 ;
45 e l s e i f s t r cmp i ( x , ’ High ’ )
46 P_WD{a} = (1+ P_WOD{a } ) / 2 ;
47 e l s e i f s t r cmp i ( x , ’ Modera te ’ )
48 P_WD{a} = (1 + (6∗P_WOD{a } ) ) / 7 ;
49 e l s e i f s t r cmp i ( x , ’Low ’ )
50 P_WD{a} = (1 + (19∗P_WOD{a } ) ) / 2 0 ;
51 e l s e s t r cmp i ( x , ’ Zero ’ ) ;
52 P_WD{a} = P_WOD{a } ;
53 end
54 HEP{a} = P_WD{a } ;






2 %% Find 1 Sample Du r a t i o n f o r A l l P a t h s
3
4 f u n c t i o n [ Sample_Dura t ion ] = f i n dSamp l eDu r a t i o n (
C r i t i c a l _ P a t h s ,HEP)
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5
6 op t s = s p r e a d s h e e t Impo r tOp t i o n s ( " NumVariables " , 3 ) ;
7 op t s . Shee t = " RA_Set_Example " ; %
Update ( Shee t Name )
8 op t s . DataRange = " I4 : K10 " ;
% Update ( P r e cedence
L i s t Range )
9 op t s . Var iab leNames = [ " VarName5 " , "VarName6 " , "VarName7 " ] ;
10 op t s . Va r i a b l eType s = [ " cha r " , " c h a r " , " c h a r " ] ;
11 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " VarName5 " , "VarName6 " , "VarName7
" ] , " Whi t e spaceRu le " , " p r e s e r v e " ) ;
12 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " VarName5 " , "VarName6 " , "VarName7
" ] , " EmptyF ie ldRule " , " au t o " ) ;
13 Recove r yAc t i onSe t s = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( " Mic r og r i d
Recovery Pa t h s Te s t / I n p u t Data / Recovery Ac t i on S e t s . x l s x
" , op t s , " UseExcel " , f a l s e ) ) ;
14
15 s = Recove ryAc t i onSe t s ( : , 1 ) ;
16 t = Recove r yAc t i onSe t s ( : , 2 ) ;
17 RA = d i g r a ph ( s , t ) ;
18
19 op t s = s p r e a d s h e e t Impo r tOp t i o n s ( " NumVariables " , 4 ) ;
20 op t s . Shee t = " RA_Set_Example " ; %
Update ( Shee t Name )
21 op t s . DataRange = "C3 : F7 " ;
% Update ( Task L i s t
Range )
22 op t s . Var iab leNames = [ " I n s e r tA sGe n e r a l " , "VarName2 " , "
I n s e r tA sGen e r a l 1 " , "VarName4 " ] ;
23 op t s . Va r i a b l eType s = [ " cha r " , " c h a r " , " c h a r " , " c h a r " ] ;
24 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " I n s e r tA sGe n e r a l " , "VarName2 " , "
I n s e r tA sGen e r a l 1 " , "VarName4 " ] , " Whi t e spaceRu le " , "
p r e s e r v e " ) ;
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25 op t s = s e t v a r o p t s ( op t s , [ " I n s e r tA sGe n e r a l " , "VarName2 " , "
I n s e r tA sGen e r a l 1 " , "VarName4 " ] , " EmptyF ie ldRule " , " au t o " )
;
26 Task_Dura t ion_Times = s t r 2 d o u b l e ( t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( "
I n p u t Data / Recovery Ac t ion S e t s . x l s x " , op t s , " UseExcel " ,
f a l s e ) ) ) ;
27
28 [ RA_paths , RA] = g e t p a t h s (RA) ;
29 [ Weights ] = f i n dWe igh t s ( Task_Dura t ion_Times , HEP) ;
30 f o r k = 1 : numel ( RA_paths )
31 f o r y = 1 : l e n g t h ( Task_Dura t ion_Times )
32 RA. Nodes . Weight {y} = Weights {y } ;
33 end
34 p a t h _ d u r a t i o n ( k ) = sum ( c e l l 2ma t (RA. Nodes . Weight (
RA_paths {k } ) ) ) ;





2 %% Find Node Weight ( Du r a t i o n Times )
3
4 f u n c t i o n [ Weights ] = f i n dWe igh t s ( Task_Dura t ion_Times , HEP)
5 %% Se t up t h e Impor t Op t i on s and impo r t t h e d a t a
6
7 % Sample t ime from P ( f a i l / s u c c e s s ) o f Expon e n t i a l
D i s t r i u b t i o n
8 mu_low = Task_Dura t ion_Times ( : , 2 ) ;
9 mu_high = Task_Dura t ion_Times ( : , 3 ) ;
10 mu = Task_Dura t ion_Times ( : , 4 ) ;
11
12 a = 1 ;
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13 % Random number from Expon e n t i a l D i s t r i b u t i o n
14 f o r i = 1 : l e n g t h ( Task_Dura t ion_Times )
15 r { i } = random ( ’ Expon e n t i a l ’ ,mu) ;
16 i f r { i } > HEP{a } ;
17 Weights { a } = exprnd ( mu_low ( i ) ) ;
18 e l s e
19 Weights { a } = exprnd ( mu_high ( i ) ) ;
20 end





2 %% Find Al l P a t h s
3
4 % Path Code from Ma t l a bCen t r a l
5 % ( h t t p s : / /www. mathworks . com / m a t l a b c e n t r a l / answer s /417396−
c a l c u l a t i n g − a l l −pa th s −from−a−given −node− in −a−d i g r a ph #
answer_335365 )
6
7 f u n c t i o n [ pa th s , topo_g ] = g e t p a t h s ( g )
8 %r e t u r n a l l p a t h s from a DAG.
9 %the f u n c t i o n w i l l e r r o r i n t o p o s o r t i f t h e g raph i s no t
a DAG
10 p a t h s = {} ; %pa t h computed so f a r
11 [ n i d topo_g ] = t o p o s o r t ( g , ’ Order ’ , ’ s t a b l e ’ ) ; % s e t s
t h e a l g o r i t hm t o s t a b l e [ s e e l i n k ] . Shows Nodes as
I n t e g e r s .
12 endnodes = [ ] ; %c u r r e n t end node of each pa t h f o r
e a s i e r t r a c k i n g
13 % fo r i = t o p o s o r t ( topo_g ) %i t e r a t e ove r a l l nodes
14 f o r i = n id ;
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15 i f i n d e g r e e ( topo_g , i ) == 0 %node i s a r oo t ,
s imp ly add i t f o r now
16 p a t h s = [ p a t h s ; i ] ; %#ok<AGROW>
17 endnodes = [ endnodes ; i ] ; %#ok<AGROW>
18 end
19 %f i n d s u c c e s s o r s o f c u r r e n t node and r e p l a c e a l l
p a t h s t h a t end wi th t h e c u r r e n t node wi th
c a r t e s i a n p r o du c t o f p a t h s and s u c c e s s o r s
20 t o r e p l a c e = endnodes == i ; %a l l p a t h s t h a t need
t o be e d i t e d
21 s = s u c c e s s o r s ( topo_g , i ) ;
22 i f ~ i s emp ty ( s )
23 [ p , t a i l s ] = ndg r i d ( p a t h s ( t o r e p l a c e ) , s ) ; %
c a r t e s i a n p r o du c t
24 p a t h s = [ c e l l f u n (@( p , t ) [ p , t ] , p ( : ) , num2ce l l (
t a i l s ( : ) ) , ’ Uni formOutput ’ , f a l s e ) ; %append
p a t h s and s u c c e s s o r s
25 p a t h s (~ t o r e p l a c e ) ] ;




Matlab Code for HPIRA Test Plots and Statistics
1 % CVS Impor t o f each Component Recovery Du r a t i o n Times
2 [ example ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’ Example . csv ’ ) ) ;
3 % [ po l e ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’ Downed Po le . csv ’ ) ) ;
4 % [ g e n e r a t o r ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’ Gen e r a t o r Loss . csv ’ ) )
;
5 % [ s u b s t a t i o n ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’ S u b s t a t i o n Loss . csv
’ ) ) ;
6 % [ pv ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’PV Loss . csv ’ ) ) ;
127
7 % [ rb ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’ R e c h a r g e a b l eB a t t e r y Loss . csv
’ ) ) ;
8 % [mcb ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’ M u l t i c e l l B a t t e r y Loss . csv ’ )
) ;
9
10 d a t a = example ;
11
12 % S t a t i s t i c s
13 [ C r i t i c a l _ P a t h _Du r a t i o n , C r i t i c a l _ P a t h ] = max ( d a t a ) ;
14 [ Max_Recovery_Time , Path_Index_Max ] = max (
C r i t i c a l _ P a t h _D u r a t i o n ) ;
15 [ Min_Recovery_Time , Pa th_Index_Min ] = min (
C r i t i c a l _ P a t h _D u r a t i o n ) ;
16
17 Mean_Recovery_Time = mean ( C r i t i c a l _ P a t h _D u r a t i o n ) ;
18 SD = s t d ( C r i t i c a l _ P a t h _D u r a t i o n ) ;
19 Var i ance = va r ( C r i t i c a l _ P a t h _D u r a t i o n ) ;
20
21 x = C r i t i c a l _ P a t h _D u r a t i o n ;
22
23 % P l o t s
24 % Line
25 p l o t ( d a t a )
26 ho ld on
27 p l o t ( C r i t i c a l _ P a t h ( Path_Index_Max ) )
28 % p l o t ( C r i t i c a l _ P a t h ( Pa th_Index_Min ) , Min_Recovery_Time , ’ g ∗ ’ )
29 x l a b e l ( { ’ Recovery Pa t h s ’ , ’ ’ } )
30 y l a b e l ( { ’ Recovery Time ( h r ) ’ , ’ ’ } )
31 s e t ( gca , ’ Fon tS i z e ’ , 12 , ’ XTick ’ , [ 1 : numel ( d a t a ) ] )
32 f i g u r e
33
34 % His togram 1
35 edges = [ 0 : 1 : 6 0 ] ;
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36 h1 = h i s t o g r am ( x , edges ) ;
37 [N1 , edges1 , b in1 ] = h i s t c o u n t s ( x ) ; % Number o f Bins
38 [ maximum_ocurrences1 , o c u r r e n c e _b i n 1 ] = max ( h1 . Va lues ) ;
39 x l a b e l ( { ’ Recovery Time ( h r ) ’ , ’ ’ } )
40 y l a b e l ( { ’ Frequency of Occurence ’ , ’ ’ } )
41 s e t ( gca , ’ Fon tS i z e ’ , 12)
42 xl im ( [ 0 , Max_Recovery_Time ] ) ;
43 i = max ( o c u r r e n c e _ b i n 1 ) ;
44 r1 = h1 . BinEdges ( i : i +1) ;
45 r1 = [ r1 f l i p l r ( r1 ) ] ;
46 y1 = [0 0 repmat ( h1 . Va lues ( i ) , 1 , 2 ) ] ;
47 h1_pa t ch = pa t c h ( r1 , y1 , ’ r ed ’ ) ;
48 ho ld o f f
49 f i g u r e
50
51 % His togram 2
52 most_common_durat ion = mode ( round ( C r i t i c a l _ P a t h _D u r a t i o n ) ) ;
53 most_common_path = C r i t i c a l _ P a t h ( most_common_durat ion ) ;
54 d = d a t a ( most_common_path , : ) ;
55 edges = [ 0 : 1 : 6 0 ] ;
56 h2 = h i s t o g r am ( d , edges ) ;
57 [N2 , edges2 , b in2 ] = h i s t c o u n t s ( d ) ; % Number o f Bins
58 [ maximum_ocurrences2 , o c u r r e n c e _b i n 2 ] = max ( h2 . Va lues ) ;
59 x l a b e l ( { ’ Recovery Time ( h r ) ’ , ’ ’ } )
60 y l a b e l ( { ’ Frequency of Occurence ’ , ’ ’ } )
61 s e t ( gca , ’ Fon tS i z e ’ , 12)
62 xl im ( [ 0 , Max_Recovery_Time ] ) ;
63 c = o cu r r e n c e _ b i n 2 ;
64 r2 = h2 . BinEdges ( c : c +1) ;
65 r2 = [ r2 f l i p l r ( r2 ) ] ;
66 y2 = [0 0 repmat ( h2 . Va lues ( c ) , 1 , 2 ) ] ;
67 h2_pa t ch = pa t c h ( r2 , y2 , ’ r ed ’ ) ;
68 ho ld o f f
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Matlab Code for Modeled Multi-Scale Microgrid Failure
Event BOE Calculation
1
2 % CVS Impor t o f each Component Recovery Du r a t i o n Times
3 [ po l e ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’Downed Po le . c sv ’ ) ) ;
4 [ g e n e r a t o r ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’ Gen e r a t o r Loss . csv ’ ) ) ;
5 [ s u b s t a t i o n ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’ S u b s t a t i o n Loss . csv ’ ) )
;
6 [ pv ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’PV Loss . csv ’ ) ) ;
7 [ rb ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’ R e c h a r g e a b l eB a t t e r y Loss . csv ’ )
) ;
8 [mcb ] = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( r e a d t a b l e ( ’ M u l t i c e l l B a t t e r y Loss . csv ’ ) ) ;
9
10 % Des i r e d I n p u t s − Manual I n p u t s o f F a i l e d Systems
11 Po le = 500 ;
12 Gene r a t o r = 25 ;
13 S u b s t a t i o n = 8 ;
14 PV = 50 ;
15 RB = 6∗ S u b s t a t i o n ;
16 MCB = 4 ;
17
18 % To t a l Recovery Time
19 f o rma t bank
20
21 f o r k = 1 : Po l e
22 Po l e _Du r a t i o n ( k ) = sum (max ( po l e ( : , k ) ) ) ;




26 f o r k = 1 : Gene r a t o r
27 Gene r a t o r _Du r a t i o n ( k ) = sum (max ( g e n e r a t o r ( : , k ) ) ) ;
28 t o t a l _ g e n e r a t o r = sum ( r e s h a p e ( Gene r a t o r _Du r a t i o n , [ ] , 1 ) ) ;
29 end
30
31 f o r k = 1 : S u b s t a t i o n
32 Su b s t a t i o n _Du r a t i o n ( k ) = sum (max ( s u b s t a t i o n ( : , k ) ) ) ;




36 f o r k = 1 :PV
37 PV_Durat ion ( k ) = sum (max ( pv ( : , k ) ) ) ;
38 t o t a l _ p v = sum ( r e s h a p e ( PV_Durat ion , [ ] , 1 ) ) ;
39 end
40
41 f o r k = 1 :RB
42 RB_Durat ion ( k ) = sum (max ( rb ( : , k ) ) ) ;
43 t o t a l _ r b = sum ( r e s h a p e ( RB_Duration , [ ] , 1 ) ) ;
44 end
45
46 f o r k = 1 :MCB
47 MCB_Duration ( k ) = sum (max (mcb ( : , k ) ) ) ;
48 t o t a l _mcb = sum ( r e s h a p e ( MCB_Duration , [ ] , 1 ) ) ;
49 end
50
51 % To t a l Recovery Time ( h r s )
52 Tota l_Recove ry_T ime_hour s = sum ( t o t a l _ p o l e + t o t a l _ g e n e r a t o r
+ t o t a l _ s u b s t a t i o n + t o t a l _ p v + t o t a l _ r b + t o t a l _mcb )
53 Tota l_Recovery_Time_days = To ta l_Recove ry_T ime_hour s / 24
54
55 c l e a r
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1
2 % Recovery P r e d i c t e d Max / Min Values Impor t o f each Component
Recovery Du r a t i o n Times
3 [ ~ , shee t_name ]= x l s f i n f o ( ’ Recovery Ac t ion S e t s . x l s x ’ ) ;
4 f o r k =1: numel ( shee t_name ) ;
5 [ ~ , ~ , p r e d i c t e d {k }]= x l s r e a d ( ’ Recovery Ac t i on S e t s . x l s x ’ ,
shee t_name {k } ) ; % Update
6 end
7
8 % Des i r e d I n p u t s − Manual I n p u t s o f F a i l e d Systems
9 Po le = 500 ;
10 Gene r a t o r = 25 ;
11 S u b s t a t i o n = 8 ;
12 PV = 50 ;
13 RB = 6∗ S u b s t a t i o n ;
14 MCB = 4 ;
15
16 % To t a l Recovery Time
17 f o rma t bank
18
19 % Pole P r e d i c t e d Values
20 Pole_Min = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {2} ( 26 , 4 ) ) ;
21 Pole_Max = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {2} ( 26 , 5 ) ) ;
22 Tota l_Po le_Min = t ime s ( Pole , Pole_Min ) ;
23 Tota l_Pole_Max = t ime s ( Pole , Pole_Max ) ;
24
25 % Gene r a t o r P r e d i c t e d Values
26 Genera to r_Min = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {3} ( 26 , 4 ) ) ;
27 Generator_Max = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {3} ( 26 , 5 ) ) ;
28 To t a l _Gene r a t o r_Min = t ime s ( Gene r a t o r , Genera to r_Min ) ;
29 Tota l_Gene ra to r_Max = t ime s ( Gene r a t o r , Generator_Max ) ;
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30
31 % Sub s t a t i o n P r e d i c t e d Values
32 Subs t a t i on_Min = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {4} ( 26 , 4 ) ) ;
33 Subs t a t i on_Max = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {4} ( 26 , 5 ) ) ;
34 To t a l _Sub s t a t i o n _Min = t ime s ( S u b s t a t i o n , Sub s t a t i on_Min ) ;
35 To t a l _Sub s t a t i on_Max = t ime s ( S u b s t a t i o n , Subs t a t i on_Max ) ;
36
37 % PV P r e d i c t e d Values
38 PV_Min = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {5} ( 26 , 4 ) ) ;
39 PV_Max = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {5} ( 26 , 5 ) ) ;
40 Total_PV_Min = t ime s (PV , PV_Min ) ;
41 Total_PV_Max = t ime s (PV , PV_Max) ;
42
43 % MCB P r e d i c t e d Values
44 MCB_Min = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {6} ( 26 , 4 ) ) ;
45 MCB_Max = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {6} ( 26 , 5 ) ) ;
46 Total_MCB_Min = t ime s (MCB,MCB_Min) ;
47 Total_MCB_Max = t ime s (MCB,MCB_Max) ;
48
49 % RB P r e d i c t e d Values
50 RB_Min = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {7} ( 26 , 4 ) ) ;
51 RB_Max = c e l l 2ma t ( p r e d i c t e d {7} ( 26 , 5 ) ) ;
52 Total_RB_Min = t ime s (RB, RB_Min ) ;
53 Total_RB_Max = t ime s (RB, RB_Max) ;
54
55 % To t a l P r e d i c t e d Recovery Time ( h r s )
56 Tota l_Recove ry_Min_hour s = sum ( To ta l_Po le_Min +
To t a l _Gene r a t o r_Min + To t a l _Sub s t a t i o n _Min + Total_PV_Min
+ Total_MCB_Min + Total_RB_Min )
57 Tota l_Recovery_Min_days = To ta l_Recove ry_Min_hour s / 24
58 Tota l_Recovery_Max_hours = sum ( Tota l_Pole_Max +
To ta l_Gene ra to r_Max + To t a l _Sub s t a t i on_Max + Total_PV_Max
+ Total_MCB_Max + Total_RB_Max )
134
59 Tota l_Recovery_Max_days = Tota l_Recovery_Max_hours / 24
60
61 c l e a r
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